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"In the last decade
two kinds

of this century

of companies:

there will remain

only

the fast ones and the dead ones."
Andrew

Intel-president1

Grove,

I. Introduction
This thesis

describes

the legal implications

lawyers

face when creating

require

non-traditional

Virtual
strategic
separate
servicing

Enterprises
2

alliances
entities

that come together
The term virtual
where

forms of legal services
are similar

to work together

markets,

but virtual

that
delivery.

to joint ventures

and

in the manufacturing

Enterprises

informal,

Enterprises

"virtual memory"

differ

spontaneous

fast and break up fast.

acts as if it has more abilities

1Neidische

Enterprises"

in that they are formed by 2 or more

in that they are more

industry

"virtual

and problems

derives

or

from these

partnerships

3

from the computer

describes

a computer

and capabilities

that

than it

Esel, DER SPIEGEL, May 24, 1993, at 200.

2This term will be used here as meaning a cooperative
venture of two or more companies without forming a separate
entity as opposed to a joint venture (see infra notes 87-94
and accompany ing text), ROBERT P. LYNCH, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
JOINT VENTURES AND CORPORATE ALLIANCES 7 (1989).
3

John A. Byrne et al., The Virtual Corporation,
Feb. 8, 1993, at 98, 103.
1

Bus. WK.,

2

4

actually

possesses.

"The virtual

Corporation

single

entity with vast capabilities

result

of numerous

collaborations

seems to be a

but really

assembled

is the

only when

needed". 5
The term is nevertheless
Davidow
using

and Marlone

all available

devices

in their book describe
advanced

but nevertheless

this context

used in some different

management

remaining

a corporation

and venturing

a separate

the term means more a "virtuous"

entity.6

In

than a

corporation.7

"virtual"

Nagel used the term to describe
formed

ways.

by fictional

electronic

corporations

temporary

alliances

in the year 2006 through

links which are nevertheless

legally

incorporated

en t't'
1 leSe 8
I will use the term again in a slightly
The creation
creates

of a separate,

a host of new problems

might want to avoid;
therefore

4-5

generally

4'd
~

.

5'd
~

.

6

WILLIAM
(1992).
7

legally
which

incorporated
fast moving

a pure contractual
preferable

different

entity
partners

relationship

for corporate

way.

is
9

partnering.

H. DAVIDOW & MICHAEL S. MALONE, THE VIRTUAL CORPORATION

Byrne et al., supra note 3, at 103.

8

2 ROGER NAGEL & RICK DOVE, IACOCCA INSTITUTE AT LEHIGH
UNIVERSITY, 21sT CENTURY MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISE STRATEGY 79 (1991).
9THOMAS F. VILLENEUVE ET AL., CORPORATE PARTNERING 1-6

(1992).

3

A description
virtual

of the basic functional

Enterprise

important
similar

reasons

today.

when cooperative

for forming

such an enterprise
joint ventures

In essence,

"companies

arrangements

better

address

strategies,

,
transactlons

, 't'lons.,,10
or acqulsl

Today,

"Alliances

complete

development

and abilities

of new products

becomes

especially

useful

in development

industrial

process

10'd
~

Virtual

the

that no one

Enterprises

and production

equipment

electronics.,,14 To be competitive

alone;

so expensive

biotechnology,

control

of knowledge

to compete

alone the full risks.13

and software,

are

today no longer have the

can assume

hardware

traditional

"Technologies

are both a cause and an effect

knowledge

their

can do it alone anymore". 11

competl't'lon. ,,12 Companies

intense

are

will collaborate

than do go-it-alone

so fast that nobody

which

and strategic

requirements

changing

of the

is best started with a list of the most

to those for forming

alliances

elements

are

of "computer

telecommunications,
and consumer

in these markets,

.

11

Byrne et al., supra note 3, at 100.

12JOSEPH L. BADARACCO, JR., THE KNOWLEDGE LINK 10 (1991).
131 ROGER NAGEL & RICK DOVE, IACOCCA INSTITUTE AT LEHIGH
UNIVERSITY, 21sT CENTURY MANUFACTURINGENTERPRISE STRATEGY 14 (1991).
14

1 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 1-2.

4

corporations

have to form alliances

and new, redefined

re 1a t'lons h'
lpS. 15
Based

on these

business
I

foundations

and on the assumption

in the future needs to be flexible

propose

here the functional

Enterprise"

which

is the subject

- concurrent
highly

development,

sophisticated

- high

lived, highly

of the "Virtual

marketing

and servicing

of a

with short life-cycle

by

companies.

flexible

levels of coordination

- comprehensive

or "agile",16

of this thesis:

product

two or more specialized
- short

elements

that

end results

enterprise.
and trust.

may not be identified

in

advance.
- distribution
- ability

of rewards

to operate

contemporaneous
as potential
- quick

dealing

competitors

after the fact.

of participants

on other endeavors

on same product

of a fast changing

traditional

with business

15
Byrne
note 12, at
at 1-17.

in context

competitors

exploitation

Unfortunately

determined

legal services

transactions

being
as well

in the future.
opportunity.

by lawyers

and arrangements

17

are

et al., supra note 3, at 103; BADARACCO, supra
11, 12, 79, 83; VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9,

161 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, foreword.
17
VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 1-3.

r

5

unsuitable

for such future alliances

more open-ended
specific,

contractual

arms-length

partnering

relationship

20

A

should

be created

present

situation

Conversely,

classical

its influence
relational
these

needs.

of the
"rapid

contract

law with

of the future through

on the reality

the ongoing

relationship

of the ongoing

must be delivered

venture.

by lawyers

its

contracts

in the area of joint ventures

It neglects

contracting

be or

alliances.21

or neoclassical

on exact prediction

alliances.

but an analysis

to support

does not help very much
other

might

will help in itself to create

mechanisms"

emphasis

appropriate

legal subsystem

by government,

in

have to be able to

by creating

streamlined

cooperation

of "highly

and it must be considered

therefore

these relationships

arrangements.

instead

is a system and an ongoing

this context.,,19 Lawyers
support

arrangements"

"looser,

contracts.,,18 "A corporate

arrangement

interdependent

that require

and
and
Thus,

to serve

22

18
BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 4.
19

VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 1-3.

20'd
~

21

.

2 NAGEL & DOVE,supra note 8, at 55.

22steven R. Salbu, Joint Venture Contracts
Tools, 25 IND. L. REv. 397, 424-427 (1991).

as strategic

r

6

Creating

a complex

five months

joint venture

to three years.

"an attorneys

paradise"24

23

within

in markets

Writing

today takes

these contracts

is

but might not help the parties

.
very muc h f or th'elr ongolng
opportunities

contract

.
ven t ure. 25 Meanw h'l
1 e, c h anglng

might require

quick cooperation

days, based on trust and not on complete
26

contracts.

to be taken

Time has market
into account

value27

and has therefore

by the legal professionals.

"start up costs in time and legal resources"

The

need to be

or removed.28

reduced
Legal

systems

way, giving

are often constructed

a complete

and dogmatized

law, intellectual

property

Special

like the Virtual

entities,

adjustment
linking
entities

picture

law, trade secrets

of these horizontal

the different

in a "horizontal"

systems

Enterprise,

systems
together

29

"The role of the lawyer

law etc.
need

in a vertical
to support

and make them and the legal services

competitive.

of contract

way,

these

more

... in assessing,

23

KATHRYN R. HARRIGAN, MANAGING FOR JOINT VENTURE SUCCESS 2-3
(1986); LYNCH, supra note 2, at 7.
24

BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 99.

25id.,

at 99 , 100.

26for an example,

see: DAVIDOW & MALONE, supra note 6, at

21.
27id.,
28
29

at 22.

2 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 56.
Salbu,

supra note 22, at 426.

7

structuring,
alliances
advisor,

negotiating

and implementing

is to act as facilitator,
interpreter,

of our business
This thesis

technician

people

discusses

guide,

architect,

and mechanic

and the business
adjustment

that need to be made to support

strategic

... in support

objectives."30

to the legal subsystems
the creation

of "Virtual

Enterprises".
An example

of a "virtual

corporation",

different

virtual

is Novell

Inc., a Utah based Local Area Network

software

microcomputer

NetWare

acquisitions,

LAN software

LAN software

is "executing

compete

to reach

its strategic

goals,

(LAN)

market

has a marketshare

a comprehensive

alliances

strategy

market.32

33

Annatek

30Doug 1as G. Scr1vner,
.

31

of

and new product-initiatives"

in the networking

in 1991,

in the

of about 60 percent.

Acquisitions

used only in a few cases like the purchase
Research

many

developer.

Novell's

Novell

Enterprises

forming

to

have been

of Digital

.
34
1n 1992
or the purchase

of

. A 11 ~ances
..
S t ra t eg~c
~n th e 1990 s,

COMPUTER LAW., Dec. 1992, at 24, 30.
31craig Stedman, Novell Links DEC,
ELECTRONIC NEWS, Feb. 17, 1992, at 11.

3Com

to

NetWare,

32Evan I. Schwartz, 'The Industry Needs an Alternative'But Will It Be Novell?, Bus. WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 69.
33Bill Machrone, World-beating strategies, PC MAG.,
Sept. 15, 1992, at 87.
34caryn Gillooly, Novell Unwraps Distribution Product
Plan, NETWORK WORLD, Oct. 5, 1992, at 2, 67.

8

the Unix operating
necessary
acquired

to fully combine
company.36

as a deepening
to Novell
Novell's

because
products

To compete

industry
network

variety

companies

of Novell

was considered

business

that traded

restrict

manufacturers.37

effectively

in the computer

relationships

and the development

Novell

harmful

of 15 % and harm

marketshare

and alliances

of other corporations.38

enhancing

and the

itself with Apple

These

of its open

have led to an availability

Because

applications

during

to Apple's

has established

standard

it was

a merger would be expensive,

partnerships

39

of Novell

with other hardware

party products,
system.

A merger

nevertheless

Novell

with a whole

the products

of their relationship

its relationship

market,

from AT & T,35 when

system

of many third

the value of its NetWare

operating

swears not to go into the

it could build trust
technological

in other software

information

with Novell

these relationships.40

35shawn Willett, Novell, USL Seek Tighter NetWare, Unix
Integration, INFO WORLD, Dec. 28, 1992/ Jan. 4, 1993, at 1, 96.
36

Schwartz,

supra note 32, at 69.

37Nico
Krohn
et al., Apple,
Novell
Alliance, PC WK., Dec. 14, 1992, at 6.
38

Schwartz,

Talk

Strategic

supra note 32, at 70.

39 Dave Trow b rl'd ge, Novell

Grinning In the Catbird
COMPUTER TECH. REv., Feb. 93, at 1, 8-10.
40
Evan I. Schwartz et al., A Novell Approach
At Microsoft, Bus. WK., Jan. 11, 1993, at 28.

Seat,

For Striking

9

A review

of the alliances

1993 suggests

Novell

5 reasons why Novell

formed through
sought

1992 and

these

relationships:

a} Creation
Novell

established

to create
counter

of Standards

anti-Microsoft
42

and IBM
object

exchange
standard,
d evelop

with

44

systems,

creating

Borland

OLE 2.0
branch

a new

will work together

.
,
a common communlcatl0ns

Apple,

This

1} Apple 41

to Microsoft's

and 3} Apple and Borland

Novell,

market.

to create new multiplatform

2} AT & T to link LAN's and private

an d support

Moreover,

of the computer

as alternatives

(PBX) telephone

companies

as well as to

led to alliances

that are intended

43

with various

and architectures

dominance

objective

standards

program,

relationships

new standards

the Microsoft

and New Architectures

and Lotus

to

st an d ar d ,45
intend to create

41
Amy Cortese, Apple, Novell strengthen
ties: crossplatform technology is key to alliance, PC WEEK, Dec. 28, 1992,
at 1; Nico Krohn
et al., Apple,
Novell
talk strategic
alliance, PC WEEK, Dec. 14, 1992, at 6.
.
Morrlssey,
0f' M~croso ft , IBM an d th e F u t ure: a
Conversation with Ray Noorda, PC WEEK, Oct. 26, 1992, at 147.
42 Jane

43

Amy Cortese, Group Proposes
WEEK, Feb. 8, 1993, at 16.

OLE

2.0

Alternative,

PC

.
f or
Co II' lngwoo,d
An Ant'~- M'
~croso ft a 11 ~ance
AT&T, Bus. WK., Jan. 18, 1993, at 40; Stuart Zipper, AT&T,
Novell Forge PBX/LAN Interface Links, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Jan. 11,
1993, at 14; Paul M. Sherer,
Novell, AT&T tie NetWare to
Phones, PC WEEK, Jan. 11, 1993, at 16.
44 HarrlS
,

45
Apple
D4.

Computer

Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

5, 1992, at C3,

10

together

a Vendor

standard

which

application

important

with

Intel,

interfaces,

b) Expansion
To expand
product,

endeavor,

royalty

Microsoft
46

(VIM) interface

free to 3-rd party

has been excluded

but is part of another

a set of management

to create

application

from

alliance

and distribute
programming

leading to standardization.47

of NetWare

Interoperability

the interoperability

to many different
Novell

of companies

1992/93

Messaging

Sun Tech and Sun Optics

applications,
range

is delivered

developers.

this

collectively

Independent

operating

created

systems

relationships

to develop

these relationships

of NetWare,

new products

its main
and

with a broad
in this area. In

involved:

.
t ems 48
-Sun Mlcrosys

-Hyperdesk

49

464 Heavyweights Unite on OMI, PC WEEK, Feb. 3, 1992, at
114; Jim Nash, Industry Giants Agree on E-Mail Interface,
COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 10, 1992, at 6.
47paula Musich, Vendors unite to Design Management APIs;
Group Seeks to Encourage Development of Administrative
Applications, PC WEEK, May 25, 1992, at 10; Computer Network
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at C 18; Five Computer Firms to
Create Standards to Improve Networks, WALL ST. J., May 20,
1992, at B 11.
48Nico Krohn, Novell-Sun Pact will Bring NetWare 4.0 to
SPARC, PC WEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 8.
Lewis,
Novell and HyperDesk:
Developers, PC WEEK, Feb. 8, 1993, at 40.
49Jamie

a

Boon

for

11

-AT&T50
-Microsoft51
-Banyan

52

.
t ems 53
- T exas Mlcrosys

-Lotus54
-Hewlett

Packard55

_IBM56

50collingwood, supra note 44, at 40; Zipper,
44, at 14; Sherer, supra note 44, at 16.

supra note

5~Jane Morrissey, Microsoft & Novell: Can They Bury the
Hatchet? Keeping a Peaceful Balance Has Become Increasingly
Difficult as the Two Titans' Competitive Worlds Overlap, PC
WEEK, Jan. 11, 1993, at 17.
52Tom McCusker, Novell Casts a Wider Net, DATAMATION, Dec.
1, 1992, at 28; Nico Krohn, Banyan, Novell Join Efforts on
StreetTalk-NetWare
Link: LAN leaders Plot Next Moves, PC WEEK,
June 22, 1992, at 1.
53

Micros,

Barbara Bourassa,
Systems Maker
PC WEEK, Nov. 30, 1992, at 3.

to

Put

NetWare

On

54Steve Higgins, Lotus, Novell Strategic Alliance still
On Starting Block: Development Work On Notes NLM to Begin in
1993, PC WEEK, Oct. 19 1992, at 6; Steve Higgins, Lotus, Novell
Sign Development Pact: NLM Version of Notes Is Expected, PC
WEEK, April 6, 1992, at 1.
55
Novell, HP Team Up on NetWare for PA-RISC,
12, 1992, at 3.

PC WEEK, Oct.

56Michele
Dostert,
NetWare,
Host
Integration
Still
Elusive, COMPUTERWORLD,Sept. 7, 1992, at 1; Jane Morrissey, IBM
and Novell Update Joint Technology Pact, PC WEEK, August 31,
1992, at 1; Kevin Tolly, Nito Roque, NetWare and Mainframes:
A More Perfect Union, DATA COMMUNICATIONS, Sep. 21, 1992, at 7376;
Bob
Brown,
Year-Old
IBM-Novell
Deal
Outperforming
Expectations,
NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 10, 1992, at 2, 77.

12

-Memorex

Telex

57

.
d yne 58
-Mlcro

and Networth 59

-Ungermann-Bass
_DEC60
-3com61
-Compaq

62

-Eastman

Kodak

63

-Coopera t·lve So It'
u lons 64
-Computer

Associates

International65

57paula
Musich,
Memorex
Telex
Bets
on
Turnaround, PC WEEK, August 31, 1992, at 141.

Novell

for

58.
d
M~cro yne Corp., WASH. POST, August 17, 1992, at WB 9;
Microdyne Corp., WALL ST. J., August 11, 1992, at B 4.
59

Joanie M. Wexler, Smart Hubs to Pick Up Server
Functions, COMPUTERWORLD,May 11 1992, at 14; Paula Musich, Hubs
will Gain NetWare Services, PC WEEK, May 11, 1992, at 21; Bob
Brown,
Vendor Trio Posi tions Hubs as LAN Servers, NETWORK
WORLD, May 11, 1992, at 1, 10, 63.
60
Stedman, supra note 31, at 11; Jim Duffy, DEC Announces
LAN-Based Deals with Novell, Microsoft, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 17,
1992, at 4, 7.
61
Stedman,

supra note 31, at 11.

62Jim Nash, Novell, Compaq Tighten Ties,
Feb. 3, 1992, at 99; Jane Morrissey,
Novell,
NetWare Pact, PC WEEK, Feb. 3, 1992, at 8.

COMPUTERWORLD,
Compaq Sign

63With Eastman Kodak's Help, Novell, PC MAGAZINE, Jan. 14,
1992, at 32.
64

Karen D. Moser, Joint Venture to Bring Transaction
Processing to NetWare, PC WEEK, Jan. 13, 1992, at 16.
65
Caryn Gillooly, CA, Novell Discuss Unicenter Strategy,
NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 24, 1992, at 11-12; Nico Krohn, CA-Unicenter
to Get NetWare Port., PC WEEK, August 24, 1992, at 16.

13

-Intel

66

Most of these agreements
products

of Novell's

partners.

agreement

involving

18 months

to 35 without

agreement.
programs

67

about 15 products

which

created

expanded

the need of renegotiation

Only then, to speed up completion

the agreement.

to incorporate

interfaces

to one or two

with IBM Novell

and to add six new projects,

renegotiate
vendors

were related

into their system

relationships

software,

with these vendors,

of the

IBM and Novell

application

had to

software

programming

Novell

offering

within

of some

To help independent

NetWare

an

also created

them

. t ance. 68
aSS1S

c) Filling

Product

To develop
formed

Gaps

new products

alliances

-Hyperdesk,

and fill product

gaps, Novell

with:
to bring object orientation

microcomputer-based

to

LAN's.69

Hubs,

66Timothy O'Brien, Intel, Novell Unveil
NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 3, 1992, at 19-20.

HMI-Compliant

Pact,

67Jane Morrissey, IBM and Novell Update Joint Technology
PC WEEK, August 31, 1992, at 1.

68Nico Krohn, Novell to Help ISVs create NetWare NLMs, PC
WEEK, Jan. 27, 1992, at 18.
69.Lewls,

supra no t e 49, a t 40 .

14
- IBM and BusTech,
controller/host
-Computer

to develop

network

Associates

capabilities

a communications

controller.

International,

70

to bring mainframe

to LAN's to help in the downsizing

of

,
t'lons. 71
app 1lca

-Ungermann-Bass
products.
-Eastman

and NetWorth,

Kodak,

to accommodate

to create

d) Distribution

packages,

agreements

color photo

files in

images.73

object

oriented

software.

74

the distribution
Novell

of NetWare,

formed distribution

e.g. in
or resale

with:
75

-Gupta

Technologies

' h
MUS1C,
IBM Teams Up t 0
PC WEEK, Nov. 2, 1992, at 7.

70 Pau 1a

Connector,

hub

agreements

To facilitate
product

new wiring

72

LAN's and to manipulate
-Serius,

to develop

71
Krohn,

Offer

Host

Network

supra note 65, at 16.

72MUS1C
'h , supra no t e 59, a t 2 1.
73Nico
Krohn,
Technology
Lets LAN Users Manipulate
Images: Kodak, Novell Project to Accommodate Color Photo Files
in NetWare 3.2., PC WEEK, March 2, 1992, at 4; with Eastman
Kodak's Help, Novell, supra note, at 32.
74Jim Nash, For start-up, $ 2 Million
COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 27, 1992, at 113.

is Serius

Money,

75John Pallatto, Novell, Gupta Sign Distribution Deal, PC
WEEK, June 8, 1992, at 22; Alison Eastwood, Novell Maintains
Enthusiastic Approach, COMPUTING CANADA, July 6, 1992, at 55-56.

15

-Compaq

76

-Re t'lX 77

e) Support

alliances

To help the interoperability
Novell

also formed

support

and distribution

alliances

of NetWare,

with many smaller

partners.
"The

(Alliance Program)

integrators:

1. early access to software

2. custom modification
testing

facilities,

strategy,

and 5. discounts

"The Regional

4. briefings

on Novell

Program

consultants

with greater

Novell."

76Morrissey,

X.400

program

Membership

access to product

discounts,

aimed at
provides

information,

and potential

sales

leads

80

supra note 62, at 8.

77Timothy o'Brien, Retix Joins with Novell to Deliver
to NetWare, NETWORK WORLD, Nov. 2, 1992, at 31-34.
78Mark Schlack, Novell Courts Integrators

LANs,

might

is explicitly

who do not resell NetWare.

through

and Platinum-

creation.79

Consultants

educational

and product

courses

consultants

support,

under development,

level products.,,78 This alliance

also lead to standard

to systems

to source code, 3. use of Novell's

extensive

reseller

offers the following

SYSTEMS INTEGRATION BUSINESS,

79scrivner,
80

Schlack,

Jun.

1992,

supra note 30, at 29.
supra note 78, at 57-58.

at

for Enterprise
57-58.
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Legal

service

requirements

of all these different
specific

and details

enterprises

goals of the enterprise

operating

characteristics.

following

analysis

requirements.

depend

for the formation
very much on the

and the therefrom

This is discussed

of the discrete

in the

legal service

resulting

II. Analytical

A. Industries
other

Discussion

of the virtual

Most Reliant

Upon Virtual

Collaborative

As mentioned
alliances

earlier,

and knowledge

difficulty

of a single

employed
areas,

81

products."
providing

B. Range

scrutinized

82

of "computer

a cost

will thus be

high technology

hardware

industrial

and software,
process

consumer

will be specialized

electronic

companies,

to create highly

with short life cycles.

of Organizational

Collaborative

81

in cost intensive,

"core competencies",82

products

and produce

Enterprise

and state-of-the-art

Partners

their

sophisticated

to develop

telecommunications,

equipment

and strategic

and the growing

alone. The Virtual

most frequently

biotechnology,

and

with the speed of

development

company

like development

control

collaborations

correlated

innovation

product

Enterprises

Agreements

are directly

intensive

Enterprise

Options

mechanisms

for antitrust

can be used
83

reasons

)

(and are especially

for both horizontal

1 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 1-2.

Byrne et al., supra note 3, at 98, 99.

83

see e.g. ELEANOR M. Fox AND LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 282 et seq., 522 et seq. (1989).
17

18

'
t a 185. ln t h e meanlng
.
or ver t'lca l' ln t egra t'lon: 84 h orlzon
of collaboration

between

similar

and vertica186

products

production
and/or

chain

linking between

distributors.

collaborative

Apart

mechanisms

of integration.

two or more manufacturers
in the meaning

of a

manufacturer,

from the Virtual

supplier

Enterprise,

are used to achieve

Some are summarized

of

various

many

types

here.

1. Joint Venture
Joint Ventures
more than three)
usually
more

may be defined
companies

for profit"87

firms create

productive

or "partnerships

activity

strategic

decisions."88

following

definition

"A joint venture
formed

business

a common

(rarely

purpose,

in which two or

entity to carry out a
and take an active

For purpose

role in its

of this analysis,

the

is used:
is a cooperative

by two or more separate

strategic

84

that pursues

a separate

economic

as "A union of two

purposes,

activity,

organizations

that creates

entity and allocates

business

for

an independent

ownership,

operational

ANDREW J. SHERMAN, ONE STEP AHEAD 209 (1990).

85

HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 133; SHERMAN, supra
note 84, at 209.
86

HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 131; SHERMAN, supra
note 84, at 209.
87
88

2 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 78.
HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 3.
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responsibilities
each member,

and financial

while preserving

identity/autonomy.
Joint Ventures
distinguished
for a single
contemplate
Juridical

to partnerships

or project,

a continuing

business

whereas

but are

have generally

A distinctive

joint venture

element

a new entity with

which may be incorporated

are created

partnerships

relationship. ,,90
simply applied

law, which has provoked

call for a separate

creates

their separate

from them in "that joint ventures
activity

resistance

and even a

statute.91

of a joint venture
its own assets

is that it

to avoid unlimited

liabilities

f or th e ]Oln
.. t ven t ure. 93 Cholce
.

form may also depend

on tax issues, regulatory

89

requirements,

and problems

92

and management

.
th e paren t companles

approval

to

,,89

are similar

decisions

partnership

risks and rewards

related

filing

of

0f

and

to third

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 7.

90John B. Power & Richard S. Kolodny, Legal and Business
Considerations on Choice of Enti ty, in PARTNERSHIP & JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENTS, Chapter 2, § 2.08 [2] (Richard D. Harroch ed.,
1992); A. Paul Ingrao, Joint Ventures: Their Use in Federal
Government contracting, 20 PUB. CaNT. L. J. 399, 406 (1991).
91A d am B. Welss
.
burg, Rev~ew~ng
..
th e Law on Jo~n
. t Ven t ures
with an Eye Toward the Future, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 487, 488, 523
et seq. (1990).
92

HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra
note 2, at 7.
93

note 23, at 2-3; LYNCH, supra

Power & Kolodny, supra note 90, § 2.08 [2]; Sara G.
Zwart, Innovate, Integrate and Cooperate: Antitrust Changes
and Challenges in the United states and the European Economic
Community, 1989 UTAH L. REv. 63, 63.
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parties,

e.g. bank credits,

joint venture

etc.

Joint venture
details

which

contract

assignments

94

agreements

anticipate

are normally

comprehensive

the issues expected

operation

Consequently,

they may take from five months

generally

96

and draft.

be followed

a "prenuptial
"1. Spirit
activity

agreement."98

A typical

... 5. Resource

of risks

Anticipated

structure."99

mechanisms

of intention,97
includes:

... 4. Method
... 6.

and exclusions

... 8.

the parties

agreements,

noncompetition

and exclusivity

agreements.

lays down in binding

100

of

for

Additionally,

into confidentiality

legal agreement

will

... 2. Realm

commitments

.•. 7. Rights

to three years

statement

of the agreement

Assumptions

agreements,

to arise during

negotiations

... 3. Key responsibilities

decisionmaking

enter

Preliminary

by a draft statement

and purpose

in

of the joint venture.95

the venture's

to negotiate

to the

may

The final

terms the exact

and terms of the contract,

relying

on what was

94stephen I. Glover & Mary A. Wallace, Drafting the Joint
Venture Agreement,
in PARTNERSHIP & JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS,
Chapter 7, § 7.02 [2] (Richard D. Harroch ed., 1992).
95id.,
96
97
98
99

§

7.01; Zwart, supra note 93, at 70.

HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 179.
LYNCH, supra note 2, at 147.
KATHRYN R. HARRIGAN, STRATEGIESFOR JOINT VENTURES 363 (1986).
LYNCH, supra note 2, at 148-149.

100

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 150-153.
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agreed

upon

percent

in the statement

of the contract

. t'lon causes
I
t ermlna

which
104

be attained.
plan

actual activities

103

The agreements

operational

questions

the operations

and build

plan really

is supposed

plan, problems

life of the joint venture.

Smaller,

are solved within

makes

sense

problems,

to follow the

often arise during
operational

the existing

the need to change contract

101id.,

will

into day-to-day-operations.1l105

the joint venture

or structural

objectives

needs and requirements

if the strategic

when converted

without

or when signing

commitment

-determine

frequently

an

set up control

later problems

-ask the tough operational
manager's

to

to:

II-establish precise

outlined

follow

ensure that the parties's
To prevent

is supposed

Though

are devoted

plan that is agreed upon before

the legal agreement.
mechanisms

negotiations

Often up to 80

an d matters. 102

The joint venture's
operations

of intent.101

however,

the

problems

relationship

terms.106

Strategic

may necessitate

at 154.

102id., at 155; HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES,supra note 98, at 365.
103
104
105
106

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 161.
HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 77.
LYNCH, supra note 2, at 162.
LYNCH, supra note 2, at 214.
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readjustment
venture

of the joint venture

contract

with the possible

contract, 107 the joint

itself may contain provisions

will also provide

for dispute

all future circumstances

anticipate,

the possible

the joint venture

111

and causes

modifications

are frequently

The agreement
prompting

joint venture

,
lmportant

will

termination

and termination

detailed

of

in advance110

focus on this

as well as how exactly
or continued

These termination
by lawyers,

to

lay down the circumstances

will be liquidated

112

participants.
very

the parties,

resolution

are difficult

since about 80% of the negotiation
issue.

between

e.g. me d'la t'lon or ar b'ltra t'lon. 109

'
mec h anlsms,
Though

deal

of the contract. 108

readjustment

To deal with these or other disputes
the contract

which

clauses

the

by other

are deemed

113",
avold extenslve

,
termlnatlon

l't'
1 19a t'lon. 114

107
108
109
110

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 214, 221 et seq.
HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 81.
Glover

& Wallace,

supra note 94, at § 7.16

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 255.

111 See supra note 102 and accompanYlng
,
112

t ex.
t

Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, at § 7.15
HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 365-367.
113id. at 365.
114

[1] .

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 255.

[1]-[2];
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2. Joint Operating

Agreement

In a joint operating
join some separate
This entity
engage

agreement

elements

in one single

is not supposed

in research

contributed

two or more corporations

to develop

and development,

elements

"working

entity".

new products

but simply

for common use through

or to

operates

the

the member

corpora t'1ons. 115 T h e con t ro II'
1ng agreemen t resem bl es
consortium

and partnership

activities

minimizes

easier

coordination

The limited

activities,

scope of

making

it

to involve more than two participants.116

The participants
defines

agreements.

what

contributions

agreement.

draft a concise

is to be contributed

the participants,

participants

normally

can terminate

knowledge,

their membership

2

in the

of the working

do not generally

participant

NAGEL

116'd
1.

•

117'd
1.

•

&

DOVE,

by

what the future

contribute

entry and exit poses

comp I'1ca t'10ns. 117

115

entity"

entity makes

to foresee most of the future problems,

since the parties

that

will be and when and how

The limited activity

it possible

to the "working

how it will be managed,

of the parties

agreement

supra note 8, at 78.

and

proprietary

few

24

3. Research
While

and Development

the joint venture

which

is supposed

their

own, a research

research
chance

Arrangement
is a separate

to create new products

activities

and development

of the partners

to use the results

business

and market

arrangement

especially

technology.119
enable

independence

for smaller

companies,

to use this technology
120

new information

it very
to develop

choose this agreement,

to access new technology

a joint venture.

pools the

independently.118

When companies

themselves

them on

but gives them the

The high costs and risks of R & D may make
difficult,

entity

Therefore,

while

without

new

they

giving

in their own way through
in the joint venture

is used first hand by the joint venture,

R & D arrangement

up

must deal with distributing

the

the knowledge

t o th e par t'les. 121
The partners
describes

traditionally

the operations

make a concise

agreement

of the R & D entity,

termination

and other problems

but leaving

nevertheless

enough

similar

which

its funding,

to the joint venture,

flexibility

for the

118Andrew Pollack, Uniting to Create Products, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1986, at D 1; HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at
23; HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 199; LYNCH, supra note
2, at 23.
119
120

LYNCH,

supra note

Pollack,

2,

at

24.

supra note 118, at D 1.

121HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 349-350.
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researc.h 122 Because
employees
more

provided,

influenced

& D entity.

through

the quality

personnel.

& Computer Technology

as low quality
124

However,

knowledge.

can only be transferred
employees.

90% of the member

and started hiring

for the partners

125

In essence,
through

(MCC),
provided

its own

personnel

hiring

to repatriate

"embedded

transfer

knowledge"

of appropriate

must deal specifically

intellectual

property

R & D entity

not only with financial

problems

of information

employees.

building

126

since R & D arrangements

amounts

sent to the R

Corporation

such internalized

it more difficult

developed

of people

123 An examp 1e 1S
. t he

the R & D entity rejected

personnel

of the R & D is even

, trust and relationship

0b'
Jec t'1ves.

Microelectronics

made

the performance

Consequently

are cr1.t'1ca 1

where

. d epen d ent upon the
R & D 1S

127

the partners

must provide

support,

and trade secrets,

Also the rules for providing

with

but with

"embedded"

the

large

in

the partners

122

SCHRADE F.RADTKE & ADOLPH L. PONIKVAR,COOPERATIVERESEARCHAND
DEVELOPMENT 41-43 (1984).
123

Sept.
231.

ZWART, supra note 93, at 71.

124David E. Sanger, Computer Consortium Lags, N.Y.TIMES,
5, 1984, at D 1, HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at

125id.;
126

Sanger,

supra note 124, at D 1.

BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 98-100.

127id.

at 109.
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in return with the newly developed
licensing

or repatriation

in advance,
partner's

knowledge

of employees

through

needs to be defined

while the use of this information

own hands.

C. Operating

is left in the

128

Characteristics

of Virtual

Enterprises:

An

Illustration
Two companies,
to work together
that

A-Corp.

to develop

incorporates

a network

allow professionals,
their different

and B-Corp.,

offices.

A-Corp.

software

area, while B-Corp.

products
that

has developed

existing

regarding

to develop

communication
to other
in the

special

be more efficient

knowledge

will contribute

objectives,

and timely

these

They each had

their own knowledge

these operating

experiences

segment

has acquired

to

to manage

knowledge

to the new enterprise.

and

but concluded

to use the

of each other.

The new "joint" computer
market

special

area. Both companies

started

it would

link different

want

system

and software

and link the professional

competencies

separately

of computers

office tasks,

together

"core"

and sell a new computer

e.g. lawyers or doctors,

machines

in the hardware

both domestic,

system will address

in which A- and B-Corporations'

products

do not compete.

consists

of a combination

However,

because

a special
existing

the new product

and further development

of each's

128pETER LoRANGE & JOHAN Roos, STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 11 (1992);
HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 231.

27

"old" products,
these

there

is a potential

for competition

with

"old" products.

The new product
on the resulting
contributed

is defined

product

get advantage
markets.

engineering,

same time rather
sequences.

information

formulates

certain

defined

and provide

the companies

than develop

needed

but

flexibility.

need to participate

proprietary

of work product

in

the

confidential

work activities

information

which may

like trade

secrets

work products.

The most profitable
within

in

parts at the

parts of the product

about their respective

and copyrightable

use of the resources

this "contractual
exchanges

firm" requires

and integration

from relationships

of both

the superior

with outside

performance

a pattern

that differs

essence superior knowledge of inside resources
generates

rights

to accommodate

i.e. work on different

must share considerable

valuable

significantly

A- and B-

a short time to

To ensure these parts fit together,

corporations

companies

because

Sharing

To work efficiently,
concurrent

within

to be

likely to enter the targeted

only summarily

uncertainties

1. Information

include

a contract

Thus, the contract

anticipated

are undefined

over competitors

leaves many others

form, but details

and on the efforts

by each company

Corp. need to formulate

in outline

suppliers.

In

of each other

of the collective

28

entities,129
sharing

but this entails

concerning

legal rights

the virtual

a fluid form of information
Enterprise

that leaves many

undefined.

2. Joint Use of Facilities
The companies
itself possess
produce

come together

time consuming,

3. Joint

and facilities

and to add what is needed

expensive,

Therefore

facilities

each of them does not

all the "core competencies"

the new product,

flexible.

because

and make the enterprise

they share their already

to produce

would

to
be

less

existing

the new product.

Contracting

The virtual
partnership,
the parents

contract

can also not act in agency
would contract

or customers,

independently
enterprise.

is not incorporated

it cannot therefore

If the parties
suppliers

Enterprise

for itself,

independently

with outside

they would be held liable

But the virtual

Enterprise

with the

is planned

unit or firm and will develop

identity,

its product

partner's

old products.

this own identity

and

for the enterprise.

and would also be identified

as a different

or a

will be distinguished
If the enterprise

to exist

some unique
from the

is to be known by

or name and the enterprise's

product

being

129Armen
A. Alchian
& Harold
Demsetz,
Production,
Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
777 (1972) ,reprinted in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATIONLAw AND SECURITIES
REGULATION 19 (Richard A. Posner & Kenneth E. Scott eds., 1980).
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identified

with the enterprise

the partners

and not the parent

need to act for and on behalf

Enterprise,

jointly

contracting

companies,

of the Virtual

with outside

suppliers

and

consumers.

4. Development

of Joint Marketing

and Support/Service

Efforts
The enterprise
incorporated
a "normal"

does not exist as a separate

and with own facilities
corporation.

The parent

on their own and in co-work
servicing
coverage

for a new market

may compete
130

support

The parents

in marketing

and providing

and servicing

and

will provide

products

together,

will or

of the two

offering

e.g. offering

the product

A useful way might

to buy all rights

and market

marketing

will be able to either provide

its own line of products.131

product

or

will therefore

but nevertheless

existing

of sale facilities,

allow one parent

companies

The new product

segment,

with other already

companies.

like a joint venture

have to provide

for the new product.

entity,

and service

in

be to

of the enterprise's

new

it alone.

130Example:
The Borland Office Package competes with
already
existing
products
from Borland
and Wordperfect;

Borland and WordPerfect Corp. Introduce Product Suite;
Companies Announce strategic Alliance, Business Wire, April
21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Business File.
131 Example: Borland offers the Borlan d Offlce
.
Wordperfect the Workgroup Extension Pack; id.

Pac k age,

III. Analysis

of Discrete

The formation
be based

Legal Service

of the Virtual

Enterprise

on some form of contract.

in the form of a computerized
minimizes

dependence

requires

sophisticated

electronic

lawyers

need to be done.132

today need adjustment

contract

cooperative
lawyers

agreement

linkages

that

and a very

Joint venture

to the specific

market

and costly renegotiation

This will be similar

agreements

but

so that no detailwork

were too "rigid" or, conversely,

"relational".133

contract"

upon lawyers would be optimal,

legal environment

avoid unnecessary

will necessarily

An "electronic

"workflow"

"streamlined"
would

Requirements

contracts

situation

to

later if the
too

in the future

and lets therefore

by

expect

for

that

also in the future should and will be part of

cooperative

contracts

Cooperative

formation.

agreement

contracts

may be seen by the

corporate

managers

as only nets for situations

where

,
somethlng

went wrong, 134 b ut a contex t senSl't'
lve con t rac t

132
supra

1 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 9, 39; 2 NAGEL & DOVE,
note 8, at 55-56.

133
134

Salbu, supra note 22, at 414.
HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 363.
30

31

can progressively
it work better.

Because

may significantly
evolution

influence

different

influence

approaches

enterprise

of future conditions,135

focuses

on the approaches

forming

virtual

articulated
defined

the whole relationship

Enterprises.

in the context

by Ian Macneil.

to contracting

planning

and the

the following

of greatest

utility

These approaches

of a "contract

He defines

and make

material

to lawyers
are

typology" 136

contract

as "the

, t'lon of exc h'
,
proJec
ange lnto the future" 137, and dlvldes
the different

approaches

towards

neoclassical

and relational

A. Classical

Contract

in classical

135salbu,
136'd
~

.,

contracting.138

Law

The main goal of contract
promoted

this goal into classical,

law, to facilitate

contract

law by enhancing

exchange,

is

discreteness

supra note 22, at 398.

at 399.

137Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts 47 s.
CAL. L. REv. 691, 712-713 (1974) [hereinafter Macneil 1974].
138Ian Macneil,
Contracts: Adjustment of Long- Term
Economic
Relations
under
Classical,
Neoclassical
and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 854 (1978)
[hereinafter
Macneil
1978]. Macneil
now calls relational
situations
intertwined situations to give way the argument
that any, even the most discrete transaction, exists within a
relational setting: Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory
as Sociology : A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos,
143 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 272 (1987).
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an d presen t·1a t'10n. 139 T h e d'1screteness
enhanced

by treating

parties,

delimiting

rules

for which

the contract,

the nature

acts establish

limiting

consequences
contract

as irrelevant

and excluding

the identity

the substantive
remedies

.
1S

of the

of the transaction,

available

clear, defining

of the contract

setting

content

of

to make

a sharp "in" or "out" of the

third party participation

in the

contract. 140
The clear

limits and definitions

of classical

law make

it inherently

easier to predict

contract

and therefore

inherently

141

presentiation.
towards
equate

In addition

presentiation

promises

that formed

the future

of the

enhance

to this, directly

are additional

the legal effects

contract

techniques,

of the transaction

it; by providing

which

with the

a concise

that deals with the areas not explicitly

aiming

body of law

addressed

in the

139Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 862; Salbu, supra
note 22, at 400; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONSOF
CAPITALISM 69 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON 1985]. presentiation
is understood
by Macneil
-following
the Oxford
English
Dictionary 133306 (1933)- as: "to make or render in place or
in time; to cause to be perceived or realized as present". Ian
R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its
Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus",
75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018, 1019 (1981).
140Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 863-864; WILLIAMSON
1985, supra note 139, at 69; Salbu, supra note 22, at 400.
141Macneil

1978, supra note 138, at 864.
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promises

and by emphasizing

expectations

created

Discreteness
means,

might

strategies.
might

today.

In today's

the original
achieved

more instable,

throughout

these

market

fluid markets

classical

for corporate

deal.142

But stable

conservative

and therefore

a "disservice"

this

contracting

strategies

could

of

144

B. Neoclassical
Between

Contract

the extremes

relational,

intertwined

term contracts
law.

based upon the

a stable situation.143

lead towards

be dangerous

deliver

throughout

and presentiation,

will create

situations

remedies

145

which

Law
of very discrete
transactions

can be foreseen,

situation

might

situation

finally has ariven

avoid a breakdown

142 ~'d

only when the
might

assert

ea d t 0 d'lSpU t es. 146 To

of the classical

law system,

some

.

143salbu,
144'd
~

adapt ions to the new

and participants

,
'I
clalms,
WhlCh

contract

often not all

be dealt with effectively

,
state-contlngent

and

lies the area of long-

is dealt with by neoclassical

In long term contracts

contingencies

transactions

supra note 22, at 401.

.

145Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 865; WILLIAMSON 1985,
supra note 139, at 70.
146WILLIAMSON 1985, supra note 139, at 70.
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flexibility

planning

neoclassical
d egree

0f

is incorporated

contract

law,147 while

and dealt with by
it maintains

a high

b'l't y. 148
comml'tmen t an d st all

Flexibility

enhancing

law are e.g. "Standards,
Performance,
Agreements

One-Party

means used by neoclassical
Direct Third-Party

Control

of Terms,

to Agree and Planning

contract

Determination

of

Cost-Terms,

for Nondisruptive

Dispute

Settlement. ,,149
The use of standards
to standards

or indices

e.g. th e consumer
third party
In direct
independent
content

control."

set by an independent

party will determine

of the contract.152

an "indirect

of provisions,
directly

substantial

The contracting

nevertheless

an

parties

increasingly

can

common

clauses which can defer the matter

arbitration

147'd
~

third party,

151

third party control

use of arbitration

and the contract

'd ex. 150 This constitutes
ln

use any third party;

certain

binds the parties

chambers.153

The available

is the
to

remedies

.

148salbu,

supra note 22, at 40l.

149 Macnel'1 1978, supra note 138, at 866-876.
150'd
~ ., at 866.
151salbu,

supra note 22, at 402.

152 Macnel'1 1978, supra note 138, at 866.
153Macneil,
id.,
at
866-868;
Gerald
Aksen,
Legal
Considerations in Using Arbitration Clauses to Resolve Future
Problems Which May Arise During Long-Term Business Agreements,
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can be broadened
154

procedures.

substantially

by arbitration

Since the continuing

much more valuable

relationship

than a mere damage

award,

can be

a wider

scope

o f reme d"les lS very d'
eSlra bl e. 155
In one-party
to define
choice;

control

substantial

sometimes

terminate

of terms one party will be eligible

parts of the contract

he/she may even decide

or continue

the relationship

the latter case the drafters
pitfalls

provider

have to be careful

to avoid the

inevitably

A downside

is that they do not encourage

cost. Recoupment

of a

to the costs he bears while

-which may be unforeseeable.158

cost-terms

of costs is guaranteed

undetermined

the party to
and this may

to agree" the parties

parts of the contract,

will

leave

but agree in advance

28 Bus. LAw. 595, 595 (1973).
Aksen,

supra note 153, at 601.

155id. at 597.
156Macneil

1978, supra note 138, at 868-869.

157'd
~

.,

at 869.

158'd
~

.,

at 869.

159

of

lead to inefficiency.159

In an "agreement

154

to

altogether. 156 In

binds the compensation

of goods or services

performing

reduce

independently

own

of consideration-theory.157

The use of cost-terms

using

by his/her

Ingrao,

supra note 90, at 417.

to
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later agree upon these gaps.160
gaps relate

to important

have held that agreements

is nevertheless

in which

the parties

negotiate

towards

final agreement
To avoid
relationship

because

often also provide
arbitration

because

feel themselves

the prior

more obliged
In most

situation
to

instances

a

reached.162

breakdowns

of a transactional

of unanticipated

for grievance

clauses,

contracts

leads to a psychological

is actually

often

Use of these agreements

a final agreement.

immediate

courts

to agree are not valid

not meaningless,

of the parties

when these

parts of the contract,

unenforceable.161

and therefore

commitment

Especially

grievances,

resolution

a form of alternative

contracts

through
dispute

't
reso Iu t'lone 163 A very lmpor
an t suppor t'lve func t'lon t 0
avoid breakdown

is delivered

lead to continuation

by such clauses

of the relationship

which

force or

throughout

the

d'lSpU t e. 164
By all these means the neoclassical
discreteness

and presentiation

flexibility,165

160Macneil

system

sublimates

to gain some

but it still relies

on the rule that the

1978, supra note 138, at 870.

.
162'd
~ .
161'd
~

163salbu,
164Macneil
165id.,

supra note 22, at 405.
1978, supra note 138, at 876 et seq.

at 885; Salbu, supra note 22, at 405.
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creation

of the transaction

contents

are done mainly

parties

to the contract

adaptability

and the definition

through

the full consent

at the beginning;

in very relational

of its

contexts

of the

this limits
in which

rules are

f orme d th roug h ou t th e eX1S
't ence 0 f th e re 1a t'10ns h'lp. 166

C. Relational

Contract

Law

Relational

contract

law is a conscious

'1
rea 1,t
1 y 0 f commerc1a

and complexity

possible

adaptability

of contracts

of neoclassical

from the premise

ways to project

tries to establish

a contractual

,

expectations"169
,

1n nonpromm1ssory

ways:

impedes

even the

contract

that only promise

the most efficient

"relational

to the

,
re 1a t'1ons. 167 T h'
e lncreas1ng

duration

Parting

response

law.168
or consent

future exchange,

are

Macneil

system that is based on

and that projects

the future

170

"In a truly relational
the entire

relation

the change

in question

approach

the reference

as it had developed
... This mayor

point

is

to the time of
may not include

166 Macne1'1 1978, supra no t e 138, a t 8 85 .
167salbu,

supra

supra note 22, at 405.

168WILLIAMSON 1985, supra note 139, at 71; Macneil
note 138, at 901.
169Macneil
170id.,

1974, supra note 137, at 715, 718.

at 719, 720, 726-735 et passim.

1978,
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an 'original

agreement';

and if it does, mayor

may not

'
t d e f erence b'
,
,
171
resu It J.ngrea
eJ.ng gJ.ven
J.t."
Of critical

importance

are the "relational
of the relation,
propriety

volatile

between

discreteness

remedies

174

Instead

relational

dispute

important

contract

171Macneil

through

like mediation

The "three basic contract

just by the interpretation

monetized

law favors

especially

contract

than

of simply

resolution,

not cease to exist in relational

in

the need for

interests

"
,
of restJ.tutJ.on,
relJ.ance
an d expec t a t'J.ons"175

served

As

especially

becomes more

of the relationship,

of alternative

and negotiation.

conflict,

in a certain way and providing

as substitutions,

exchanges

preservation

norms".172

evolve,

circumstances,

and presentation.173

the continuation
methods

of relational

the parties

in the transaction

a dispute

oriented

of "role integrity,

and supracontract

and turbulent

flexibility

solving

norms"

harmonization

of means

relationships

in such relational

h d0
w h'J.C

law will not be

of an initial

agreement,

1978, supra note 138, at 890.

172 Ian R. MacneJ.,
'I
VI'
a ues ~n C on t rac t : Internal and
External, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 340, 361 (1983).
173salbu,

supra note 22, at 406.

174salbu, supra note 22, at 407; Macneil
137, at 741.
175Macneil

1974, supra note

1978, supra note 138, at 898.
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but by taking
developed

into account

throughout

any behavior

Cost Analysis

a View Towards

Virtual

How should parties

creation
answer

choose between

which

transactions

analyses

cost analysis

exchange."

178

governance

with

market

serve best the
insightful

using transaction

the economics

"explicitly

of how firms should define
in order to maximize

A initial,

can be derived

instead of general

Transaction

Approaches

the different

and which one would

Enterprises?

to this question

cost analysis

of Contractual

Enterprises

approaches

of virtual

which

the relationship.176

D. Transaction

contractual

patterns

of single

analysis. 177
addresses

or set organizational

the efficiency

the question
boundaries

of economic

It tries to find the "most economical

structure"for

an abstractly

described

t ransac t'lone 179 T h e ana l'
YS1S f ocuses on th e cos t s f or
creating
structure

176'd
~

a specific
throughout

structure

and the costs occurred

the lifetime

by this

of the relationship.180

.

177salbu,

supra note 22, at 411.

178David E. Bowen & Gareth
Analysis of Service OrganizationMGMT. REv. 428, 428-429 (1986).

1790liver E. Williamson,

R. Jones, Transaction Cost
Customer Exchange, 11 ACAD.

Transaction-cost Economics: The

Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233, 234235 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson 1979J.
180id.,

at 239, 246.
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The "three critical
transactions
frequency

dimensions"

are, according

of transaction

which

characterize

to Williamson,

uncertainty,

and the transaction

specific

,
tmen t s lnvo
'
1ve d .181
lnves

1. Transaction
The first
governance

Specific
important

structure

investments

Wl'II'
lamsons

on the market

where

the

investments

"idiosyncratic"

transactions,

in

incorporating

discrete

full utility

relationship

rely

other suppliers

and buyers

and

If, however,

., at 239.

182 ~'d

.,

at 239.

183'd
~

.,

at 240.

184'd
~

.,

at 239, 241.

the

investments

only in the context

they must employ

181'd
~

but

can easily

contracts.184

can be captured

investments

the parties

are best served by idiosyncratic

continuous

the

will likely have a major

i.e. "idiosyncratic"

are no specific

just standardized

parties

specific

nomenc 1a t ure. 183

If there

use highly

throughout

those situations

of the parties

on costs,

the appropriate

is to assess the transaction

and identify

identity

influence

step in defining

likely to be required

relationship182
specific

Investments

whose

of a

a contractual

41
framework

that is relationship

"attenuate

opportunism

As noted earlier,
specialized

Enterprises

product.

and abilities

of the partners,

knowledge
highly
virtual

between

to the enterprise
obtainable

are therefore

extensively

a "Classical

highly

on the quality
A discrete,
Contract

them to efficiently

The work and

is therefore
on the market.

idiosyncratic

and

of the relationship

inflexible

contract

Law" approach

achieve

knowledge

into the

its existence.

and not readily

the partners.

embodYlng
permit

they contribute

Enterprises

dependent

as brought

during

by

and build a highly

They rely on the specific

or developed

specific

are formed

in order to develop

sophisticated

enterprise

i.e.

and ... infuse confidence'I.186

Virtual

companies

oriented,185

will not

their collective

objectives.

2. Frequency
Creation
relationship

governance

incurs generally

a discrete,
structure

of a specific

classical

contract

structure

187

If parties

a

more setup costs than writing
where the general

is well known and can be easily

implemented.

within

governance

and cheaply

be

would deal just once with each

other these costs would not be recoverable;

conversely

185'd
1. .,

at 241.

186'd
1.

.,

at 242.

187'd
1.

.,

at 246; Salbu, supra note 22, at 416.

the
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costs are recoverable

throughout

a longer relationship

behavioral

patterns

develop which make the working

enterprise

smoother

and therefore

enforcement
frequently
therefore

of classical
parties

approach.

A corporate
created

requires

The more

of a specific

is a living entity

through

based on

and is not just

one contract. 190

of the strategic

the parties

structure,

189

alliance

and consumed

Accomplishment

provisions.188

to confer

goals of the enterprise
frequently

with each other.

This will be in the long run more easy and efficient
the enterprise

is open to the development

and adjustment

patterns

classical
dealing

contract

organized

is therefore

through

follow

The frequent,

the existence

more efficient

when

of consultation

and does not rigidly

law provisions.

of the parties

Enterprise

than

deal with each other the more efficient

is the creation

a relational

of the

more cost efficient

contract

when

ongoing

of the Virtual

if the enterprise

in a more relationship-growing,

is

open way.

3. Uncertainty
If circumstances
without

incurring

are certain,

the parties

easily

and

many costs will be able to draft a highly

188Williamson 1979, supra note 179, at 246, 259; Salbu,
supra note 22, at 416.
189williamson
note 22, at 416.
190

1979, supra note 179, at 246; Salbu, supra

VILLENEmffiet al., supra note 9, at 1-2.
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discrete
choice

contract;191

therefore

of the governance

However,

there is no problem

structure

under uncertain

of

under certainty.192

circumstances

two possibilities

exist:
If the transaction
always

is not idiosyncratic,

can and will substitute

each other through

and do not need to rely on relation
con t rac t s, as noted.193
parties

specific,

specific

the market

expensive

Even 1'f uncer t aln
't y eX1S
't s, th e

still can easily rely on the market

dependent

the parties

and are not

upon each other; they still do not need to build a
relationship

to satisfy

their needs and incur

t ransac t'lon specl'f'
lC cos t s. 194 It wou Id th ere f ore b e more
costly

and inefficient

of a discrete
standardized
s t ructure

contract

under

idiosyncratic

transactions

to guarantee

law for

the most efficient

throughout

circumstances.

transaction

specific

the relationship.196

Salbu, supra note 22, at 413.

192williamson

1979, supra note 179, at 253-254.

193see supra notes 184-186 and accompanying
194 Wl'II'
lamson
195'd
~

text.

1979 , supra no t e 179 , at 254 .

.

196see supra notes

As

call for a more relational

that the incurred

costs can be recovered

191

is therefore

contract

creation

't y. 195
even un d er uncer t aln

idiosyncratic

approach

a relationship;

under classical

transactions

The scene changes
shown,

to establish

185-186 and accompanying

text.
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Under uncertain

circumstances,

will even increase

the need to work problems

due to the always new, unpredicted

,
t ances. 197 T 0 sus t'
'
Clrcums
aln th e ongolng
the parties
approach

will need constant

Enterprise,

idiosyncratic

dealing

open to a constant

communication,
contracting

that relies

the relationship
about certain

a highly

circumstances

changes.

and

frequent
relational

less on the original

provisions

details,

of the virtual

that requires

necessitates

more on contractual

character

under uncertain

a relationship

provisions

the most economic

'h' mac lnery. "198
"adaptlon

The highly

creating

re 1a t'lons h'lp,

adjustment;

will be very relational,

,
sequentlal

out

susceptible

approach

contract

they may memorialize

199

But their general

approach

as

are sure

them in detailed

to avoid costs later when renegotiating

clear details.

and

to adaption

To the extent the parties

to

should

otherwise
be

relational.

E. Details
Even though

the parties

with a relational

197Williamson
198'd
~

approach

want to form a contract
that facilitates

199salbu,

readjustment

1979, supra note 179, at 254.

.
supra no t e 22 , a t 414 .

quickly,
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throughout
start.

200

the relationship,

some details

They are summarized

1. Aim/goal

of the Virtual

Initially,
the virtual
definition

the partners

Enterprise
of business

"determination

Enterprise
need to outline

scope includes
or services

of geographic

markets

specification

of the intended

arrangement."
Revised

Model

articles
scope;

201

202

the purpose

duration

Corporation

3 dimensions:
to be sold; selection

of incorporation

outputs;

to describe

and

of the

is created
Act

of

scope. The

in which to distribute

When a corporation

Business

at the

below.

and its business

of products

are needed

the

(RMBCA) allows
a certain

if this not done, the corporation

the

business

is presumed

200Nagel and Dove in creating their "Virtual Corporation"
through
electronic
links
altogether
without
lawyers
nevertheless
ask the partners of the future enterprise
to
choose some provisions from a "menu" that provides them with
some critical components, chosen depending on the purpose and
type of the consortia. They list as menu: 1. Charter and Aim
of the Organization; 2. Anti-Trust Considerations;
3.Size of
Companies
and
Membership;
4.
Membership
responsibilities/Details;
5. Intellectual Property Rights; 6.
Financial
(and other) resources;
7. Tiering
Relationship
between Participants;
8. Government Role; 9. Definition
of
output-Deliverables
Expected;
10.
Benefit
and
Equity
Allocations;
11
Term
and
Break-up
Details;
Operating
Principles/Mechanisms
and Resource Decisions; 13. Staffing. 2
NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 55.
201steven

Considerations

R. Salbu
& Richard
A. Brahm,
in Designing Joint Venture Contracts,

strategic
1992 COLUM.

Bus. L. REv. 253, 258.
202REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2.02

(b) (2) (1992).
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to be allowed

to do "any lawful business.,,203 If the

parties

become very specific

would

business

scope definition,

predictability

business

of the enterprise

of the agreement

205

reached.

they would

to the enterprise,204

the flexibility
termination

Using a relational

open as under

3.01

§

the relationship

but this would

and could

contract

to strengthen

approach,

and use their competitive

feel comfortable

even where partners
where problem

solutions

survey

suggests

least on the enterprise's
success

factor

understand

203
204

207

with open
as problems

that they need to agree at
since an important

partnering

is that the parties

goals and business

objectives,209

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.01

(a) (1992).

& Brahm, supra note 201, at 258-259.

Salbu

205id.;
206

0b'
Jec t'lves.

are devised

purpose208

for corporate

their mutual

throughout

seek to use collaborative

However,

practical

the

should be left somewhat

cer t'
aln

arise,

limit

goals were

'
a d van t ages 206 w h'l
1 e pursulng

contracts

and

lead even to

(a) RMBCA so it may evolve

as the companies

of

insert stability

if outlined

scope of the enterprise

mechanisms

in the progress

HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 178.

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 324.

207'd~

.

208'd~

. at

at 323.
335.

209VILLENEUVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 1-19; James A.
Dobkin & Jeffrey A. Burt, A Legal and Practical overview of
International Joint Ventures- The United states Perspective,
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and that this understanding
the alliance

continues

The parties

throughout

should therefore

for the formation

strategic

and declaring

outline

changes,

that warrant

thereby

retaining

uncertain,

volatile

Enterprise

works make

the purposes

also design

agreement.

evaluate

setting

desires

They should

along the three

If the

to define

in advance

schedule

the situation

specific

both

and the

the parties
in which

should

they meet

and readjust

the

213

in JOINT VENTURES WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS Chapter
(James A. Dobkin & Jeffrey A. Burt eds., 1989).
210Dobkin & Burt, supra
AL., supra note, at 1-19.
211

and

in which the virtual

adjustment,

review

of the

if the situation

flexibility.212

it difficult

that warrant

periodically,

the reasons

at the same time for

adjustment

situations

a frequent

purposes

and provide

of the enterprise

contingencies

agreement,

and financial

specific

scope dimensions

contingencies

outline

their relationship.211

some reasonably

business

briefly

how they want to communicate

build trust throughout

of

the relationship.210

of the cooperative

forth the tentative
partners

about the scope and nature

note

209,

& Brahm, supra note 201, at 260-261.

213'd~ ., a t 261.

1-7

at 1-6; VILLENEUVE ET

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 149.

212salbu

1, at

48

2. Legal

structure

In a joint venture,

the partners
214

they both own and support.

the partners
eventually
duration

contribute

of the Virtual

may be relatively

managerial
requires

In a virtual

for themselves.

Enterprise

an independent

entity,

"th
par t nerlng

an crea t'lng an d' runnlng

undefined

Except

and

a pure
as where

contractual

for corporate
a corpora t'lone 217

brings with

it also further

and disadvantages.

An advantage
is that earnings
in a regular
corporation's
contractual

215

relationship

the

of the enterprise

a purely

will be less troublesome

they

Additionally,

216

independence

relationship

214

which

is normally

makes more sense.

and operational

advantages

Enterprise

short. Under these circumstances

approach

But a contractual

the joint venture

their core competencies

want to retain

contractual

Moreover,

its resources.215

owns directly

form a new entity which

of a contractual

arrangement

of the enterprise

corporation

earnings

are taxed only once while
are taxed double,

and at the shareholder's
form more desirable

or partnership

level; this makes the

than the corporate

see supra notes 87-94 and accompanying

at 11; LYNCH, supra note 2, at 119.

217VILLENEUVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 1-6.

form when

text.

LoRANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 12.

216id.,

at the
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,
earnlngs
double

, t e.
d 218 A corpora t'lon cou ld aVOl'd
are an t'lClpa

taxation

only when it would be eligible

an S corporation,

being treated

par t ners h'lp. 219 However,
in an S corporation
availability

as shareholders;220

management

as

like a

corpora t'lons may no t ta k e par t

to non-corporate

maximizing
structure

for tax purposes

of the S corporation

Enterprises

to operate

form for virtual

partners.

efficiencies

should play a more

this limits the

Furthermore,

through

important

a certain

role than maximizing

'
221
t ax savlngs.
A shortcoming
the parties
debts.

to unlimited

Limited

desirable

222

engage

enterprise
risk when

218

Dobkin

provided

the partners,

undertake.

However,

liability

liability

for the partners

risks which

would

of the contractual

form is that it submits
for the enterprises's

by incorporation

if the enterprise
even combined,

entails

high

do not wish to

in a cost intensive

to develop

research

new standards

and combining

as opposed

already

&

Wallace,

supra

note

to "normal"

existing

to avoid the risk of a creditor

Glover

and development

products.

"piercing

94,

§

7.02

& Burt, supra note 209, at 1-19.

219power

221

be

This might be the case if the partners

joining

220'd
~

might

& Kolodny,

supra note 90, § 2.08

[5].

.

Lynch,

222Dobkin

supra note 2, at 122.

& Burt, supra note 209, at 1-6, 1-8.

the

[2]

[a];
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corporate
venture

veil",

the partners

adequately

would need to capitalize

and to operate

the

it as a separate

ent't
1 y. 223
Another

problem

complicates
because

of the contractual

accounting

issues for the Virtual

it does not exist as a separate

consolidation
'
en t erpr1se

and income recognition

agreement
a separate

entity was formed,

the assignment

Financial
when the

its viability

of leases or other contracts

This might need consent

parties

might

226

this transfer.

its own approved

on behalf

to transfer

the new entity might
rules and structures

able to deal with outsiders.
agreement

to the new
The

their own

if bank credit agreements

Moreover,

restrict

need to
before

being

Under these circumstances

is more convenient.

of the enterprise,

The parties

thereby

223Glover
& Wallace,
supra note 94,
Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-19.

If

might require

of third parties.225

also find it difficult

to the new entity

contractual

the contractual

as well as disadvantageous.

entity.

together

entity.

is made easier

with third parties,

can be advantageous

establish

Enterprise

" 1ncorpora t e d .224
1S

When dealing

assets

form is that it

§

a
act

using their

7.02

[2]

[b]i

224J. Michael
Schell
& Marc J. Segalman, New Deal
structures
in the 1990's: Mergers of Equals and strategic
Alliances,
in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATECONTROL 1991, at 575, 611 (PLI
Corp. L. and Pract.
225Glover
226'd~

.

Course Handbook

& Wallace,

Series No. 731, 1991).

supra note 94,

§

7.02

[2] Ed].
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already

facilities

227

credit
which

existing
lines.

Enterprise

that it deals autonomously

perhaps

will operate might

with outsiders

228

consider

with outsiders:

The parties

if the Virtual

act on its own and therefore
separate

necessitate

-banks,

suppliers,

conversely

if the parties

for the enterprise,

Enterprise

funding

primarily

thereby

is supposed

to deal

needs to

needs to be created

entity with all backup

and

should therefore

how their enterprise

either

and
in

so that it would have to be independent

incorporated.

carefully

structures

On the other hand the environment

the virtual

customers-

and approved

as a

and requirements

or

want to act themselves

eliminating

the need for a new

entity.

3. Capitalization
a. Initial

and Resource

Funding

At the formation
need to provide
expected

of the Virtual

some initial

expenses

new corporation
which

is founded,

property-

new entity.229

227
228

assets

the parties

that matches
business

the parties

the

scope. When a

explicitly

-including

employees

will have to be transferred

In the Virtual

Enterprise,

identify
and
to the

when the

supra note 90, at 409-411.

Ingrao,
HARRIGAN,

229Glover

Enterprise

funding

from the outlined

cash and non-cash

intellectual

Commitment

STRATEGIES,

& Wallace,

supra note 98, at 336.

supra note 94,

§

7.07

[1] [a].
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parties

join their core competencies

product

they want to share their facilities

resources.

Transfer

not be needed,
parties

resources

should

but to get the virtual

Enterprise

going,

They might not foresee

scope of the virtual

the matching

exactly

resource

Enterprise,

as

what

commitments.

they need to

The parties

also agree how they want to share marketing
when marketing
230

the new product

synergies.

The evaluation

contributions

could be done together

distribution
infusion

the

they will need, but just as they need to outline

resources

should

and human

will need to commit these resources

funding.

the business
outline

a new

of assets to a new entity will generally

nevertheless

an initial

to develop

define

to create

of the partner's

in an after-the-fact

is needed

for a specific

with the benefit

way.

231

If a major

project,

should approach

cash

the parties

if they want to bear this funding

or if the enterprise

and sales

themselves

the credit market

for

. fun d 1ng.
.
232
th 1S

b. Problem

of Additional

Since the partners
Enterprise

230

Capitalization

and Credit

do not know precisely

will evolve,

how the Virtual

they must contemplate

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra

the

note 98, at 332-333.

231see infra notes 346-354 and accompanying
23 2HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra

text.

note 98, at 360.
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possibility

of needing

may choose
party

in advance

loans or equity

infusions
impasse

additional

or later between
investments,

from the partners.

on this important

that matter

234

options

They

of third

or loans or other capital

To avoid a potential

point,

to the general

funding.233

major

the parties

dispute

resolution

might

subject

procedure

they

establish.235

4. Responsibilities

of Partners/Operation

of the Virtual

Enterprise
Managing

a corporate

not one hierarchical
entities
jointly

working

alliance

entity,

together

is not easy since there

but two or more

intending

and share knowledge.

236

need to agree on their respective
way they want t 0 operate

their relationship

agreements.

facilities

therefore

responsibilities

an d manage

and the

.
237 T h ey
th e a 11 lance.

need to pay at least as much attention
manage

independent

to use their

The partners

to how they want to

as to the financial

238

233Glover

& Wallace,

supra note 94, § 7.07

[2] [a].

234Glover

& Wallace,

supra note 94, § 7.07

[2] [a].

235see
236

is

infra notes 380-390

and accompanying

text.

LoRANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 19.

237

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 122; Salbu & Brahm, supra note
201, at 291, Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-10.
238HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 357.
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If the alliance
need to create
committee",

involves

a separate

entity,

a new board of directors

that can function

the partners

or "steering

as a project

review

comml't tee. 239 T h ey would need to agree on rules
setting

up these groups,

questions

of ownership

dependency

decisionmaking

or management

relationship

between

If no separate

entity

need to be solved,

and the

the new entity

is created,

but the parties

agree upon how to coordinate

and the

committee.241

a steering

of rights

and the division

of managerial

and reduce

of a steering
communicate
and adjust

these problems

nevertheless

functions

clear definition

alliance

control,

these groups,

240

partners.

through

within

for

frequently,

As far as possible,

and obligations

e.g.

a

of the partners

control would

the partners

stabilize

Through

the

creation

will be able to

build trust within

their operational

need to

of the alliance,

later disputes.242

committee,

do not

the relationship

goals and programs

to new

,
t ances. 243 T h e comml'ttee Wl'II nee d t 0 mee t
Clrcums
frequently

239

and/or

on request

of the partners;

it should

be

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 123, 131.

240id. at 123 et seq.; Salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at
291 et seq.
241

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 122.

242

VILLENEUVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 1-19; Salbu & Brahm,
supra note 201, at 295.
243LYNCH, supra note 2, at 130/131.
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outlined
allowed
major

which

changes

to implement

changes

partners

Property
of Already

Corporate
competitive

independently

will need approval

5. Intellectual
a. Protection

the steering

strategy
advantages

intended

to develop

of a strategic

often resides

in patents,

248

advantage

When the

and skills of the partners
result

in the transfer
sharing
247

alliance.

formulas

If this knowledge
of the company,

245

is

of

is often a

This knowledge

and other trade

represents

appropriation

the competitive
or uncompensated

loss of this knowledge

could be very harmful.

collaborative

can become

partners

of unique

a new product,

information

"key feature"

secrets.

Rights with the Partners

of the company.

In essence,

and what

by the partners.244

Existing

of the knowledge

246

and immediately,

Rights

and will therefore

knowledge.

should be

is based on the exploitation

form an alliance

combination

committee

competitors

249

Because

for the

244'd
~ ., at 131.
245

BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 77.

246'd
~ .,

a t 12 .

Moore,
corporate Partnering: Products
Driven structures, in CORPORATE PARTNERING, at 183, 185 (PLI
Patents, copyrights, Trademarks
& Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 248, 1988).
247Thurton

248

R.

BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 13.

249id. at 135-136; Salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 273;
HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 365.
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future,

companies

transferring

have to take precautions

competitive

advantages

against

to their potential

250
compe t't
1 ors.
Often,

intellectual

copyrights,

property

trade secrets

be part of the resource

and trademarks-251

commitment,

as a "soft" resource.252

alliance

information
Enterprise

brought

should therefore
should

intellectual

property

also later provide
. 254
knowledge.

information,

will already
into the

into the virtual

be sufficiently

defined.253
to then existing

if they do not want to be obliged

newly,

the parties

confidentiality

separately

spreading

of proprietary

should also enter into a

agreement,

limiting

developed

forbidding

leakage

use of the knowledge

to the specific

enterprise

252

Ingrao,

and specifying

supra note 90, at 413.

LYNCH, supra

253id.,

note 2, at 148.

at 151.

254weissburg,

of the

by the other

2502 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 43.
251

patents,

The confidential

limit their commitment

To avoid the uncontrolled
knowledge,

brought

by each partner

The partners

partner

-this includes

supra note 91, at 491-493.

how

to

57

knowledge

should be used and controlled

within

the

'
255
en t erprlse.
But legal provisions
limited

protect

knowledge

way, there are no absolute

, t'lon. 256 Care fu lIt'
approprla
se ec lon
partners

and the building

most effective

'ta t'lon
exp 101

0f

knowledge
protect

safeguards
0f

against

t rustwort h y

of trust within

is generally

only in a very

the relationship

in controlling

undesired

kId
h
now e ge sh'
arlng. 257 In se tt'lngs were

grows old within

and to exploit

short times, the best way to

this knowledge

it as fast as possible,

perhaps

can also be to market

even through

the

'
258
a II lance.
If a separate
to assign

entity

their relevant

new entity.

of intellectual

property

should outline

of the proprietary

case the parties

the parties

intellectual

This assignment

and spreading

termination.

is created,

property

The parties

the entity might

rights

need
to the

the use, control

knowledge.

will also have to provide

might

259

In this

for the division
own in the case of

need to agree which proprietary

255LYNCH, supra note 2, at 150-151; Glover & Wallace,
supra note 94, § 7.12 [1]; Salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at
273-276; Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-16 to 1-17.
256

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 342.

257

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 342; Salbu &
Brahm, supra note 201, at 273; BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 95.
258
259

BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 47.

Salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 274-276;
Burt, supra note 209, at 1-12 to 1-14.

Dobkin

&

58

rights

will be transferred

will be cross-licensed
developed
to which

within
partner

back to the original

among the partners,

owner or

which

the new entity will be assigned
and who will be entitled

rights
or licensed

on improvements

on

.
1y owne d' r1g ht s. 260
prev10us
If no new entity

is founded,

not need not to be transferred
life of the alliance
intellectual
that owned
knowledge

knowledge

to this entity.

property

should generally

If the parties

or will forseeably

..
a 1 so conS1.d er 1 1cens1ng

settings

competitive
263

possible.

happen,

valuable

the now existing

advantages

as a backdrop

260Dobkin

therefore

is necessary

the parties

for

might

in technology-volatile
but only temporary

of the companies

as fast as

consider

the

a crosslicensing

for the case of termination

agreement

of the alliance.

& Burt, supra note 209, at 1-14 to 1-15.

261Ingrao, supra note 90, at 413.
262salbu

the

shared

If both sides are in this position,

might

the

th 1S
. kId
..
now e gee 262 L1cens1ng

can be especially

to exploit

does

stay with the party

and further use of this knowledge

agreements

During

and in the case of termination

it previously.261

the partner

parties

proprietary

& Brahm, supra note 201, at 274.

263HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 325.
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b. Dealing

with Newly Developed

The partners
new product.
knowledge
already

of an alliance

In this process

which

existing

in high technology

they may create

The parties

and define

virtual

to develop

Enterprises

will help the parties

should

try to

and use of
operate

and contribution

the problems

later to exploit

from

frequently

is hard to be traced

Thus, addressing

a

new proprietary

ownership

areas where ownership

knowledge

265

work together

knowledge.264

this new knowledge.

volatile.

of the Enterprise

is either truly new or derivative

deal with this in advance

proprietary

Rights

of

and
in advance

their contributed

'
266 I f a
k nowle d ge an d th e new 1y d eve 1ope d t ec h no 1ogles.
new entity was created,
within

developed

for distribution

of these rights

in

' t'lone 268
t ermlna

0f

Without
agreement
rights

property

this entity will be owned by it267 and the parties

will have to provide
case

intellectual

a provision
concerning

of the parties

in the contractual

intellectual

property

would be determined

partnering
rights,
by common

the
law and

Gordon, Key Issues
in Contracting
for the
Development of Joint or Divided Products, in 12TH ANNUAL COMPUTER
LAW INSTITUTE, at 407, 411 (PLI Patents, Copyright, Trademarks
and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 301, 1990).
264Mark

L.

265'd
1.

.,

a t 412 .

266'd
1.

.,

at 413.

267

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 342.

268see supra notes 259-260

and accompanying

text.
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269

statutory

regulations.

the copyright

laws, which

a joint product
be jointly

271

A major problem

contributions

the status

272

Another

and ownership

relationship

work

their

in which

could be separated
problem

270

ideas will

created

and obligations
quite unclear

also be owned

and would

of a derivative

work.273

But the scope of the resulting

regarding

their use and protection

and lead to high uncertainty
275

A derivative

be

work and its

trade secrets would also be jointly

274

among the partners.

the

is how to determine

to the owner of the original

by the partners.

269

software,

here is to differentiate

from a collective

of the parties

separately.

questions

computer

in which two authors merged

this joint product

Jointly

includes

of

owned by both and can be independently

exploited.

owned

For a work under protection

owned

rights
would

be

about the rights

trade secret would

, ,
, 'lar
]olntly
by the deve Iopers, 276 but Slml

arise about secrecy,

Gordon,

rights

of the developers

supra note 264, at 414.

270'd
~

.,

at 415-416.

271'd
~

.,

at 419-420.

272'd
~

.,

at 420-421.

273'd
~

.,

at 421-424.

274'd
~

.,

at 426-427.

275'd
~

.,

at 427.

276'd
~

.,

at 428.

and
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the relationship

to the owner of the previously

existing

. I s. 277
ma t erla
Jointly

developed

the parties;
absolutely

independently.278
lead to problems

if a derivative

about the relationship
unsolved

problems

intellectual

patent

the partners.279

is invented,

right protection

For

again problems

arise.280

These

when different

mechanisms

apply to

281

anticipate

in their particular

adequate

agreement,

Enterprise-partners

of property

collaboration

rights

and enter

insofar as this is possible

and uncertain

normally

the virtual

the categories

inherent

would

exploitation

even more complex,

In light of these problems

constraints

This unlimited
between

owned by

to use the patent

with the inventor

become

property

one product.

should

would also be jointly

all owners are allowed

right could
example,

patents

282

circumstances.

start with a procedural

definitions

and administrative

development

monitoring

and progress

277'd
~

.,

at 429.

278'd
~

.,

at 430.

279'd
~

.,

at 433.

280'd
~

.,

at 433-434.

281'd
~

.,

at 434.

282'd
~

.,

at 435.

into an

under time

These

framework,

procedures

issues

efforts
including

such as

reports

to trace the use

62

and development
parties

of the proprietary

then can create a structure

the ownership

Enterprises

abilities.

separately

parts of the new product,

fairest

outcome

might be to let both parties

but this might be problematic

inputs.284

Joint

ownership

for these kinds of products
285

each party's

it is

to separate

However,

in the same market

if the parties

might thus be
intend to compete

with the new product,

use the product

for both parties

joint copyright

ownership

unlimited

rights

might harm them,286

in mutually

to

e.g.

developed

In suc h a S1'tua t'10n owners h ip 0 f th e pro d uc t

by one party with a limited or unlimited
to the partner,
provide

the

own what they

when

difficult

and

As far as the

develop

software.287

allocates

work together

parties

preferable.

The

that properly

the partners

their complimentary

developed,

283

rights.

In virtual
contribute

knowledge.

a better

perhaps

also cross-license

license

agreement

agreements,

might

balance.288

283'd
~ ., at 435-443.
284'd
~ ., at 453.
285'd
~ ., at 452.
286'd
~ ., at 452.
287Joseph T. Adams, Corporate Partnering
for Software
Development and Marketing, in 14TH ANNUAL COMPUTER LAW INSTITUTE,
at 553, 561 (PLI Patents, copyrights, Trademarks and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 344, 1992).
288id.,

at 561; Gordon,

supra note 264, at 447-451.
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Virtual

Enterprises

are often developed

that are or may be future competitors,
ownership
issue.

of intellectual

If technically

to retain

ownership

necessary,

property

possible,

to the other partner.

future

enterprises
developed

or divide

the owned proprietary

Whatever

general

approach

they should remind themselves

and unpredictable

high-technology

will operate,

proprietary

agree

or, if this is

to one partner

knowledge

Virtual

organizational

of their contributions

up and license/crosslicense

the volatile

joint

they should therefore

ownership

choose,

making

a major

try to assign ownership

the parties

among parties

setting

very specific

knowledge

that in
where

planning

will nearly

for

be

,
'ble. 289 Th e par t'les mus t th us re 1y upon a
lmpossl
different

than the traditional

preferably

a relational

relationship
solution

transactional

approach,

and upon procedural

of problems

relationship

rather

relying
planning

approach,290

upon trust
that allows

as they appear throughout
than relying

in the
the

the

upon "substantial"

planning

'
'd a vance. 291
t h at flxes
a 11 t erms ln
This wisdom
compelling

of a relationship

if the parties

intend to create

and the focus of their enterprise
development.

289

may be most
a new standard

is on research

of jointly developed

BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 99.

290id.,
291

Here division

approach

at 100.

Salbu, supra note 22, at 419-420.

and
proprietary

64

knowledge

needs to be completely

only to further
thereby

create

but should
retain

develop

thought

their already

a new product,

nevertheless

out. If they intend

existing

the problems

be addressed.

knowledge

and

are not as great,

The partners

could

their ownership

in the proprietary

knowledge.

as they can anticipate

that contributions

to the new, joint

product

can be separated,

the new product.
perhaps

they should also own this part of

For the parts that can not be divided

for the whole new product-

ownership

they should

to the party that will predictably

interest

in owning that part, combined

other partner.

This could also result

ownership

among the partners

licensing

agreement.

"relationship

As far

upholding"

with a license
in division

dispute

to the

of
cross-

could be made subject

alternative

the

have the most

and a complementary

Disputes

assign

-

to

resolution

.
292
mechanlsms.

6. Employees
As mentioned

above, part of the resource

be the assignment
Enterprise.

People

293

companies.
resources"

of people

by the partners

commitment

to the Virtual

belong to the "core competencies

Managing

and developing

is at least as important

these

will

of

"human

for a strategic

292see infra notes 380-390 and accompanying
293LoRANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 149.

alliance

text.
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'
'1
as f 1nanC1a
partners
virtual

' crUC1a
'1
resources 294 an d' 1t 1S

to assign the relevant
Enterprise

since Virtual
compared
usually

assign

joint ventures,

to the virtual

Enterprise

employees

with the current

project.297

entity

and work generally

to the project
299

,
obta1n

them through

296
297

or sometimes

If a new entity

hire the assigned

295

is created,

in their company,

either

294

already

while

employed

identifying

The return

in order to create

force tha t represen t s 1'tscore

partner.

the partners

of the

to their old company will allow the company

If no separate

when

they will be loyal to their

a stable relationship

in its employees

assigned

short-lived

h'1r1ng
,
new personne 1296 Wh en peop 1e

throughout

themselves

work

are normally

linked to their company,

company

invest

Enterprises

0f

that will make the

295

to "full blown"

' t ea d
peop 1e 1ns
remain

work.

people

for th e

a well educated

compe t'
enC1es. 298
the employees
although

will stay

they will be

be "loaned"

is created,

people

to

to the

this entity might

as its own employees

an emp 1oyee l'
eas1ng

or

con t rac.t 300 T h'1S

LORANGE & Roes, supra note 128, at 150.
BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 141LORANGE & Roes, supra note 128, at 153.
1 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 16.

298id.,

at 10; LORANGE & Roes, supra note 128, at 164.

299LoRANGE & Roes, supra note 128, at 153/154.
300Glover

& Wallace,

supra note 94, § 7.05

[4] [a].

66

assignment
employees

to a new entity or a project
certain

the duration

virtual

position

application

of the virtual

Enterprise

personnel

certain

duties.304

Enterprise

example

give their employees

.
provlde

career

301

But for the

about the arrangement.

303

and insure they do

the partners

these people

Virtual

after

its supporting

their worry about dismissal

p I'annlng

301

skills which may not have

to be successful,

plan how to "retrieve"

company.

Enterprise.302

not end up with a competitor,

to

of removal

back in the old company

must be enthusiastic

To minimize

for the

is related

and "deepness"

on the employer

may develop

an alternative
termination

whose seriousness

of the assignment

from the normal
Employees

problems

creates

should

carefully

after completing

The partners

could

their

for

a "right of return,,305 or

for thelr
. emp 1oyees 306 w h'lC h

LORANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 151-164.

302'd
~

., at 154, 160.

303 Thomas F. Vllleneuve
..
& Danle 1 M. Kau fmann, Crea t'~ng
Successful Technology-Based
Corporate Partnering Agreements,
COMPUTER LAw., Sept. 1992, at 10, 14; VILLENEUVE et al., supra
note 9, at 1-18.
304

LoRANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 154-155.

305Harold
L. Schneider,
Commercial
Joint
VenturesStructural and Contractual Considerations,
in COMMERCIAL JOINT
VENTURES ALl-ABA VIDEO LAw REVIEW (Q 176) 1, 1 (1989).
306

LORANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 162.
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demonstrate

how their engagement

will be rewarding
A related
employees
entity
plans

problem

adversarial

their

should

310

partners

programs

protected

't
of an asslgnmen

Another

problem

existing

and acquired

remain

on their

old

in

while being temporarily
In essence
against

the employees

loosing

any benefits

can arise when one or more of the
arrangements

Job classifications

the employee

health

for the Vlr
't ua 1 En t erprlse.
'
312

has contractual

employees.

services,

or at least retain benefits

to the new entity.311

be completely

b ecause

this

This could have an

that the employees

old employer's

assigned

payroll

If

h
It would t ere fore be preferable

as far as possiblepayroll

to a new entity,

on their already

,309
emp 1oyee beneflts.

employer's

completely

plan benefits.308

effect

307

is the fear of loss of benefits.

then have to provide

and pension

Enterprise

in both the short and long term.

are assigned

would

in the Virtual

inflexible

with unionized

and exact work rules can make

and non adaptive

for change.

313

307 Vl'IIeneuve & K au fmann, supra no t e 303 , a t 14 ; V ILLENEUVE
et al., supra note 9, at 1-19.
308

Glover

& Wallace,

309schneider,
310
311
312
313

Glover

supra note 94, § 7.05

[4] [a].

supra note 305, at 1.

& Wallace,

supra note 94, § 7.05

[4] [a].

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 351.
LoRANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 161.
BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 57-58.
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This

"organizational

the flexible
markets.314
mutually

rigidity"

adaptability

needed

Thus, the companies

dependent

descriptions

development

315

the only remaining

a Virtual

the virtual

317

Enterprise,

insert

a provision

problems
to comply

partners.318
contract

The parties

that addresses

agreement

they could outline
will contribute

on the payroll

to the virtual

315'd
~ ., at 187.
316'd
~ ., at 214.
317'd
~ ., at 263.
Adams,

facilities.

-including

314DAVIDOW & MALONE, supra note 6, at 209.

318

among the

that this personnel

of each partner

supra note 287, at 585.

so as

in their

and who will be sent to the other's
would then provide

could

these

them individually

Enterprise

which key personnel

Enterprise

remain

For example,

within

this end, the partners

to resolve

with the virtual

will not hamper

to work effectively

into the contract

and undertakes

have to make sure

and contracts

Toward

might

In sum, before

the partners

and adaptability

this

for the company

the union.

Enterprise.

Job

and unions

union blocks

chance

that their union relationships
the flexibility

vague

a

a cO-destiny

If a recaltricant

be to try to de-certify

volatile

with their unions.

intentionally

should develop

relationship.316

in today's

hampers

should try to establish

relationship

have to become

and employers

forming

of the labor unions

will

all

69

benefits-

and shall return after termination

employer.

They could also obligate

that their

employees

work within

7. Definition

and Handling

Partners
generally

each other to make sure

are contractually

the necessary

the virtual

in cooperative

have an incentive

to the original

available

to complete

Enterprise.

of Output
agreements

that are competitors

to cheat on the other partner
319

gain a competitive

advantage.

partners

often want to make sure that the other

partner

therefore

puts adequate
320

and marketing.
obligations
'

con t lngency.

Partners

as specific

322

criteria.
points"

into technology

development

will often want to design

as possible,

partners

and set up quality

considering

should define

the

every

performance

that a partner

the

and acceptance

They should set up "timetables"

to review

anticipation

alliances,

321

As far as possible,
deliverables

efforts

In corporate

to

progress.

323

may default

or "horizon

In

on his obligations,

319

OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 242-243 (1975).
320

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 374.

321

HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 178.

322

Adams,

supra note 287, at 570; Moore, supra note 247,

at 188.
323

supra

SHERMAN, supra note
note 98, at 364.

84,

at

210;

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES,

70

the partners

should provide

the other partner
enterprise,
agreement

specific.

as described,

Without

precise

to use a relational
standard

performance

control

326

contract.

327

circumstances.
active

and driving

openly

stating

refining

the

Enterprise

often are not able to be very

performance

standards,

approach

terms and requires
mechanisms

Thus, setting

performance

Virtual

contracting

performance

specific

from it or terminate

. Unfortunately,

arrangements,

e.g. giving

the right to take over the whole

withdraw

325

for remedies,324

they have

which uses general
different

than a discrete

transactional

goals rather than defining

works better under uncertain

Setting these goals and making
force in the alliance

the expectations

and specifying

them an

is best done by

of the partners

as well as

these so that the partners

can live

up to th'em ln a non- d'lsrup t'lve way. 328 T h e par t'les sh ou ld
therefore

324

in this situation

obligate

each other to use their

SHERMAN, supra note 94, at 210.

325schneider,
90, at 417.

supra

note 305, at 7; Ingrao,

supra

note

326charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles
of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1092-1093 (1981).
327

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 132.

328id.,

at 107/108.
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"best efforts"
cooperate

to reach the intended

under a "general

To reduce
partners,

the remaining

331

Monitoring

supervision

determination
standards.

d u t y. "330

conflicts

of interest

of performance,

to assess

if the technological

meets the requirements.333

be satisfied

and the alliance

in an effective

ongoing

and achieve

structured

performance

penalties,

reciprocal

329Goetz

and both have an

incentives

compliance
standards

rewards

to work fairly

with the open

such as reciprocal

or bundling

commitments.336

& Scott, supra note 326, at 1117.

330'd
~ ., at 1126.
331'd
~ ., at 1130.
332'd
~ ., at 1130.
333

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 34l.

334id., at 341, 369.
335VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 1-19.
336Salbu

will

th e a II'lance. 334 T h e par t'les

should

335

performance

when they work

trust relationship
0f

together

alliances

The partners

successful

't eres t' ln th e success
ln
thus have mutual

and

performance

in technological

of a partner

together

the

and "bonding"

e.g. auditing

with certain

But specifically

it is difficult

between

on one hand is done through

of compliance

332

and to

fiduciary

they should then set up monitoring

mechanisms.
direct

329

goals

& Brahm, supra note 201, at 296-298.
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Penalties
partner

are reciprocal

when they are exacted

fails to fulfil a certain

obligation;

as one

the partner

' h e.
d 337 Bu t' ln a Vlr
't ua I Corpora t'lon exact
ge t s punls
obligations
describe

events

trigger

Nevertheless,

as symbolic

t'lons

0f

intellectual

and therefore

certain

acts,

of a benefit

to

will be rewarded.339
transfer

rights through

share in profits

or licensing

the partner,

of

special

reimbursement

of

from the

340

Commitment

bundling

links together

- the duty of one partner

if the other partner
341

obligation.

337'd
~

can be

and of the "moral"

define

from the enterprise,

costs or an enlarged

parties

clauses

and that

goal or technical

the extended

property

to outputs

'

the parties

of a certain

may include

en t erprlse.

penalty

that will lead to a transfer

the other partner

access

to be violations

signs of commitment

awards,

e.g. accomplishment

Rewards

hard to

th e par t'lese 338

In reciprocal

development,

it is therefore

that are supposed

penalties.

valuable
bl'
olga

are hard to define;

has already

the obligations

needs only to be fulfilled
fulfilled

This allows the partners

., at 299.

338'd
~ ., at 299-300.
339'd
~ ., at 300.

340'd
~

.,

at 30l.

341'd
~

.,

at 30l.

of the

his

a flexible

73

response

depending

on the circumstances

without

resort

to

1ega 1 mec h'anlsms. 342
similar
in which

to these bundling

the parties

a II'lance. 343 T h ese
partners
efforts

would
apart

be situations
from the

d epen d'
enCles wou Id' glve t h e

to fulfill their obligations

not to endanger

that case, using
would

are interdependent

0th er

incentives

commitments

with best

the whole relationship.344

a "mutual hostage"

need less performance

situation,

monitoring

In

the partners

for the single

'
345
a II lance.

8. Benefit

Allocation

In a joint venture
exactly

the partners

will define
346

how to spread risk and rewards.

part of the exact distribution
and rewards.

347

The reward

in advance

This will be

of responsibilities,

system

risks

is based upon detailed

342 id.
at 301-302. An example here is the alliance
between Motorola and Toshiba in which Motorola promises to
release microprocessor
technology
incrementally
as Toshiba
fulfills its promise to enhance Motorola's market share in the
Japanese
semiconductor
market;
see Gary
Hamel
et al.,
Collaborate wi th Your Competitors- and Win, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.Feb. 1989, at 133, 139.
343salbu
344'd
~

.,

& Brahm, supra note 201, at 302.
at 303.

345'd
~ ., at 303.
346

LYNCH,

347id.,

supra note 2, at 132.
at 135-136.

74
an d regu It'a lons. 348 Un f ortunately,

,
promlses

virtual

Enterprise

contributions

the exact responsibilities

of the parties

left to the evolving
defined

goals.

efforts

are needed

heavily

on incentive

is impossible

relationship,

The parties

cannot

schemes.

o ft en en d· up ln gross

reward

have therefore
circumstances

shares

The parties
their

expenses

exactly

the contribution
fixed reward

subject

to arbitral

remaining

profits

depending

revenue

Cost reimbursement
as a performance

supra note 153, at 599.

3521 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 16-17.

for

depending

contributions."352

2 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 84.

.

these

For

first to
the

on the value each of them

have been implemented

351'd
~

it

each party

the partners

for their costs and divide

to the end-result.

.

where

tentative

and that they share in the profits

the partners

350'd
~

they depend

adjustments.351

can also agree to reimburse

reimburse

Aksen,

which

terms would

such as establishing

they could agree to use incoming

349

but

on the

to be set up to accommodate

example,

348

instead

Under circumstances

"agreed upon value-added

already

heavily

set up exactly

on their

contributed

defined,

.,
t'les. 349 A d'Justment
lnequl

350

changing

relying

to reach these goals,

to predict

and

are not completely

has to give to finish the work,

mechanisms

. the
ln

might

incentive

75

scheme which

is a typical

neoclassical

. t rumen.t 353 Flna
. 11 y, d eC1Slons
..
lns
could be made subject

flexibility

.
a b out relmbursement

to a dispute

resolution

.
354
mec h anlsm.

9. Antitrust
Virtual

Considerations

Enterprise

competitors

within

lessen

doctrine,

concerning

or potentially

in restraint

incorporated,
Clayton

conspiracy

companies

mutual

conspiracy

are often already

or/and will be competitors

the antitrust
competing

partners

of trade.355

in restraint

This scrutinization
challenged

as outdated

between

efforts

If the alliance
under Section

if it would

Under

can be a
is

7 of the

substantially

If it was not incorporated

still be illegal under Section
was a conspiracy

any collaboration

mutual markets,

Act and would be illegal
competition.

in the future.

their competitive

it can be scrutinized

actual

it could

1 of the Sherman Act if it
of trade.356

of cooperative
due to reliance

mechanisms

has been

on late 19th century

353See supra notes 339-340 and accompanying

text.

354See infra notes 380-390 and accompanying

text.

355Joseph
F. Brodley,
Antitrust Law and Innovation
Cooperation, 4(3) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES97 (1990), reprinted in
COLLABORATIONAMONG COMPETITORS 911, 916 (Eleanor M. Fox & Thomas
T. Halverson eds., 1991).
356 Harry M. Reasoner & Ann Lents, U.S. Ant~trus
.
t Ana 1ys~s
.
of Joint Ventures, in COMMERCIAL JOINT VENTURES ALl-ABA VIDEO LAW
REVIEW (Q 176) 85, 87 (1989).

76

and early
argued

20th century

that global

domestic

companies

of the antitrust
needed;

359,

competition

requires

now inhibited

laws,358

far reach1ng

In contrast,

of competition.357

concepts

cooperation

by earlier

and thus changes

proposals

It is
among

interpretations
are

have been made.

others have noted that rigorous

360

domestic

compe t't"
1 10n 1S essen t'1a 1 fIb
or g 0 a 1 compe t't'
1 1veness 361
and that current
enforcement

antitrust

allows

enough

f aC1'I'
1ta t e d W1'th'm1nor
within
parties

the context

to a contract

implications

law interpretation
innovative

collaborations

363

if

ch anges an d reforms. 362
of this disagreement
need to determine

about reform,

possible

that could void their agreements

the contract.

and

From this perspective

the

antitrust

before

the standards

closing
for

co 11 a b ora t'1ve agreemen t s are am b'19UOUS. 364

357

1 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 41.

358id.; Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, 4(3) J. Econ.
Perspectives
75
(1990),
reprinted in COLLABORATION AMONG
COMPETITORS 887,887
(Eleanor M. Fox & Thomas T. Halverson eds.,
1991) .
3591 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 41.
360

Jorde

& Teece, supra note 358, 903 et seq.

361

MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVEADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 117122, esp. 122 (1990).
362

Brodley,

supra note 355, at 911.

363 Do bk'1n & Bur,t
supra no t e
STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 37.
364

Jordon

209,

at

1-7;

& Teece, supra note 358, at 899.

HARRIGAN,

77
Because
innovation
reason

these agreements

are generally

and create efficiencies,

generally

, app I'
d 365, Ant1compet1t1ve
, ,
1S
1e.

against

efficiencies

order to determine

if the intended

overly

in a vertical

relationship

, t enance,
ma1n

usually

vertical

agreement

efficiencies

restrictions

Vertical

in horizontal

geographic

efficiencies
following

Restraint

is determined
potential

settings,

and product
whether

competition

that the enterprise
competition

365id.;

markets

Guidelines,

12.4

an t'1compe t'1t'1ve

are determined.369
reduces

the partners

Reasoner

in the new market,

Next

existing

or

in the market

a parallel

to a

for Antitrust

54 ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 913

Analysis

(1986).

Fox & SULLIVAN, supra note 83, at 523 et seq.

368VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 3-45.
369

Reasoner

370pitofsky,

it

& Lents, supra note 356, at 85-86.

366Robert Pitofsky, A Framework

367

the

first the relevant

the agreement
between

are

will serve. 370 For the potential

analysis

Joint Ventures,

If parties

that are part of a

,
d J an. 23, 1985.) 368 In d et erm1n1ng
..
(1ssue
effects

lead to

as per se 1'11 ega,1 367

and aimed towards

of Justice

will

in

rely upon resale price

okay under the rule of reason,

Department

.
are we1ghed

justifications

results.366

th'1S wou Id b e V1ewe
'd

but non-price
cooperative

restrictive

a rule of

effects

and other business

competitively

aimed to advance

& Lents, supra note 356, at 86, 88-89.
supra note 366, at 896 et seq.

of

78

merger

between

Justice
merger

Merger
would

allowed;

the partners

371

Guidelines

be allowed,

if a merger

is made using the Department

and the HHI index.
a collaborative

If a

agreement

would not be allowed,

will be

anticompetitive

e ff ec t s are presume.d 372 Ac h'levemen t

0f

monopoly

the agreement.

would weigh heavily

Weighing

against

are assessments
through

possible

of resulting

the integration

of whether
developed

existing

product

by any of the parties
aspects

373

restraints

efficiencies

between

the partners

would have otherwise
374

at all.

are tempered

such efficiencies

mar k e t power or

competitive

competitive

of efforts

the intended

these redeeming
whether

against

of

and

been

Of course,

by assessments

of

and other pro-competitive

effects

' t'lng means. 375
cou ld h ave b een ac h'leve d b y 1esser res t rlC
As a practical
smaller

matter

collaborative

firms used to gain efficiencies

innovations,

are not challenged

agencies.376

Alliances

371

Reasoner

372id.
373

agreements

between

and to create

by the antitrust

in the high-technology

enforcement

area by

& Lents, supra note 356, at 86, 92.

at 86

VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 3-46.

374pitofsky, supra note 366, at 904 et seq.; VILLENEUVE et
al., supra note 9, at 3-46.
375

VILLENEUVE et al.,
supra note 366, at 911.
376 Brodley,
at 114.

supra

note

9, at

3-46,

Pitofsky,

supra note 355, at 917; LYNCH, supra note 2,
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even

large companies

Contractual

agreements

than cases

parties

provisions,

the contract
concrete
allows

.
eaSler

is created.

the partners

less antitrust

with

less

risk because

goals and objectives

rather

than

2) is flexible

to change the agreement

considerations

attention

378

contracting

that could be attacked,

if markets

change and 3) generally

and
and

allows

t ermlna
. t'lon. 379

From a practical
created

standpoint,

by companies

high technology
to compete.

reasonable
unrelated
competition

to create

markets

effects.

provisions
collateral

virtual

innovations

are

and products

in

share will be too low to imply

Therefore,

if the parties

create

and do not set up overrestrictive
agreements

that restrict

beyond what is necessary

virtual

Enterprises

where they would alone not be able

Often the market

anticompetitive

goals,

encounter

either.377

less antitrust

using relational

1) specifies

actions

antitrust

also attract

in which a new entity

Furthermore,
precise

are not challenged

Enterprises

or

their

to achieve

the intended

should not meet Antitrust

problems.

377

John Markoff, Microsoft and 2 Cable Giants Close to an
Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at Section 1, p.1.
378

LYNCH,

379salbu

supra note 2, at 114.

& Brahm, supra note 201, at 285-287.
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10. Dispute
virtual

Resolution
Enterprises

Mechanisms
are formed to reach strategic

and to make the competitive
together.

However,

Enterprise

the interests

are rarely

to arise.380
litigation

advantages

identical

The classical

of both sides work

of partners

in the virtual

and thus disputes

contract

goals

approach

are likely

relies

on

with the goal to decide and to end the

d'1SpU t e. 381 T hI'
e neoc aSS1ca I approach

' not as
1S

adversarial,

to end a dispute,

resulting

but does use arbitration

costs and a mechanism

that are somewhat

with

similar

to

l't'
1 19a t'lon. 382
Unfortunately

successful

continuation

after the use of these adversarial
endangered;383
dispute

in effect

solution.384

the success

sacrificed

As stressed

of the virtual

on a trustful,

ongoing

flexibility

procedures

throughout

relationship.

of the enterprise.

may be

for the sake of

Enterprise

to be left open in the contract

of a relationship

this paper,

will very much depend
Too many details

to achieve

speed and

The parties

therefore

380HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 373.
381,
Macne11

1978, supra no t e 138, a t 891.

382id.; VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 1-20.
383 Macne1'1 1978, supra no t e 1 38 , a t 891 .
384

Salbu, supra note 22, at 407.

have

need

81

to create

an effective

will not destroy
Non-adversarial
mediation

dispute

386

business",

mechanism

that

the relationship.385
mechanisms

such as negotiation

are thus preferable

Enterprise.

resolution

Understanding

the parties

and

for the Virtual
the "give and take needed

should be able to settle

in

any

' . t ven t ures, d ea dl oc k is
d'lSpU t·
es. 387 In success fu 1 ]Oln
somehow

always

avoided

by managers

through

, ,
nego t'la t'lone 388 Mos t e ff ec t'lve are esca 1a t'lng provlslons
that will bring disputes

first to lower levels,

of the partner's

executive

here to a higher

level, e.g. the presidents

389

parents.

principle"
partners.

boards and only after

This avoids making

e.g. members
failure

of the

issues to "points

of

at an early stage that finally will separate

the

390

11. Termination
Since the Virtual
specific

Enterprise

is designed

goals which may be accomplished

to achieve

quickly

385Dobkin

& Burt, supra note 209, at 1-10.

386salbu,

supra note 22, at 407.

387
388

or become

WILLIAMSON 1975, supra note 319, at 107.
HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 366.

389scrivner,
at 418.
390scrivner,

supra note 30, at 31; Ingrao, supra note 90,

supra note 30, at 31.
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irrelevant

to the partners'

provisions

need to be made for its termination391

consequential
Specific

expiration

that normally

of the defined

consent

of the parties,

through

one partner,

trigger

occurrence

of purpose,

competitive

circumstances

appropriate
and

termination

term of the alliance,

material

fulfillment

strategies,

of rights and assets.392

distribution

events

business

include

mutual

breach of the contract
of certain

major change

events

(like

in anticipated

etc), bankruptcy

of a partner

and

' t e. 393
e 1ec t'lon th roug h el'ther par t ner t 0 t ermlna
Since virtual
to predict
terms

Enterprise

how the alliance

is seldom prudent.

394

criteria

lie on a continuum

parties,

certain

Reliance

on specifically

like reliance
because
future

will fare, setting

including

described

can successfully

mutual

of arbitrary

consent

of a single

termination

date is normally

about the business

Conversely

are unable

The other termination

upon a specific

395

frequently

events and convenience

of uncertainty
events.

partners

if managers

deal with upcoming

of the
party.

events much
undesirable

significance

of

of an alliance

problems

unencumbered

by

391 Ka th rln
' R. Harrlgan,
,
't
Jo~n
Ven t ures and Compe t't'
~ ~ve
strategy, 9 STRAT. MGMT. J. 141, at 145 (1988).
392Dobkin

& Burt, supra note 209, at 1-11.

393 Sc h nel'der, supra no t e 305, a t 10.
394

LYNCH, supra note 2, at 155-156;
supra note 98, at 367.

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES,

395HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 366.
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artificial
finally

deadlines,

upon mutual

they may find it best to terminate

consent
396

alliance

is achieved.

termination

event creates

motivate

continuation

alliance

partners

therefore

incorporating

might

partner,398

that

perceive

Termination

but prolonging
as a classical

the need of flexibility,
perhaps

termination

at the convenience

and dangerous

operating

they

even

clause

for enhancing

of one partner

for the remaining

but might have to be necessarily

for the partners

of a

that would

is best viewed

lower exit barriers,

be problematic

of the

't ua 1
Depen d'lng on h ow t h e Vlr

a convenience

flexibility.

purpose

or the occurrence

high exit barriers

, h ment provlslon.
,,397
punls
Enterprise

of contract

of the relationship,

the life of an ailing

should

It might be argued

due to breach

specific

once the intended

under highly

available

uncertain

,
t ances. 399
Clrcums
In the latter case, the protection
through

careful

perhaps

,
compensatlon

consequences

396'd~

399
400

of rights

and assets

't' lon
for complete d wor.k 400 Termlna

.

Adams,

& Brahm, supra note 201, at 292.
supra note 287, at 582.

HARRIGAN,

Adams,

comes

division

should be laid down for each kind of

397salbu
398

planning

of the partner

STRATEGIES, supra

note 98, at 324.

supra note 287, at 582.

and
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termination
The division

of intellectual

the above outlined
be returned
future.

403

rules,

402

rights

confidential

division

of assets

need to provide

or liabilities

liquidation

is intended,

liquidation

procedure.

be the "Russian

fixed buyout
one partner

liabilities

401

is

for the
at a

In case

should agree upon a
division

system

system" which does not have

terms because

after termination

will divide the "pie" up and the other will
the pieces.406

division

compensation

possible

A

roulette

or evaluation

between

not needed,

405

should

or for a buyout

the parties

follow

for the

either

price by one of the partners.

founded,

material

continued

404

certain

should

If a new entity with its own assets

the partners

choose

circumstances.

property

and confidentiality

founded,

would

401

event to fit the specific

If no new entity was

of assets or liabilities

but the partners

might consider

if one of them incurred
during

of the "child"
providing

special

expenses

is

for
or

407

the alliance.

VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 1-20.

402 See supra notes 245-292
403Dobkin

.
and accompanYlng

tex t .

& Burt, supra note 209, at 1-28 n.28.

404 LYNCH, supra note 2, at 156; HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra
note 98, at 365-366.
405Glover
& Wallace,
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Schneider, supra note 305, at 11.
406
407

note

94,

§

HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 367.
Ingrao,

supra note, at 417-418.
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The future
termination
generally

of the employees

has already

working

for the alliance

been discussed;

they should

remain with or return to their original
408

employer.

intellectual

How the parties
property

should deal with

has also been discussed

,
1y. 409 Slml
, '1ar 1y, lf
'h t e par t ners foresee
prevlous
problems
should

arising

from the enterprise's

also try to provide

appropriate

In the view of the many details
in virtual
issues

Enterprise

contracting,

like the obligations

division

of benefits,

provide

clauses.

need to outline
termination

some crucial

issues dependent

throughout

the relationship;

expressed

in the contract

specified

provisions

circumstances.

including

in a virtual

also be applied
consequences

and the exact
Enterprise

on the situation
expectations

and dispute

They

as evolved

of the parties
should prevail
uncertain

resolution

mechanisms

should

and

Enterprise.

supra notes 293-318

must

and then make the

laid down under highly

of the virtual

such important

and accompanying

text.

ee supra notes 245-292 and accompanying

text.

408see
S

provisions

to the termination

410

uncertainties.

and as evolved

Negotiation

they

that need to be left open

of the partners

partners

other

activities,

in a similar way for termination

409

upon

410HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 366.

as
over

IV. Conclusion
Contemporary
technology

areas,

concentrate
partners

competitive

thereby

enterprises,

which virtual

their

competitive

approach

to contracting

in

especially

and helps the business
Contracts

flexible

environment

relational

goals.

To support

of such

requires

strategic

and

but many important

partners

of these questions
life; procedural

as substantive

are therefore

86

and want

The solution
relationship's

at least as

but will be needed

of legal services

today and in the future.

need to

This contractual

for lawyers,

the competitiveness

and

flexible

the enterprise.

provisions.

might be unfamiliar

to maintain

questions

must be sought throughout

provisions

to

still need to be

want to remain

form and dissolve

a

that

in some detail to support the enterprise

to promptly

businesses

Enterprises.

function

open if the partners

approach

resources

and termination

The volatile

the partners,

important

virtual

maintenance

relationships

formulated

remain

and team up with

Enterprises

flexible,

supports

creating

in high

that companies

lawyers must supply unconventional,

legal services.

protect

dictate

especially

for the supply of complementary

the development,

achieve

frequently

on their core competencies

knowledge,

more

strategies,
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